FIGHTING FOR SPACE
The developing threat of space warfare

A new battlefield is emerging. Certain nations are researching, developing and planning to deploy weapons in space and so create a new medium of warfare. At present there are no weapons in space but within months that may no longer be the case and within just a few years we could see weapons that can fight from, in and through space. This document outlines some of the projects underway and being considered, looks at some of the motives for these developments and considers some of their likely impacts.

PART ONE

THE STATUS QUO
The military use of space is well established and, for the United States, which has the most fully developed military space architecture, military space assets are absolutely integral to military operations. The recent Iraq war has been labelled the first real "space-war" by some U.S. military officials because it was the first time that the U.S. had depended so strongly on space assets for military operations. In a typical battle situation the U.S. military would have been relying on
· space-based weather prediction systems (the Defence Meteorological Support Programme),
· military communications satellites (MILSTAR) to communicate from command centres and between troops,
· espionage satellites to intercept communications by the enemy and collect images of troop movements and weapons placements,
· early warning satellites providing information on missile launches
· and military GPS systems to allow troops and vehicles to navigate and to quickly and accurately specify targets and guide "smart" bombs.

Indeed, as Lt Col. White of the U.S. military said in April 2003, "Without space, we're back to World War II". 1

Beyond doubt, space is "militarised". As the timeline at the start of this document shows, space has been exploited for military purposes for decades. Despite that, there is a crucial difference between the status quo - militarised space - and the deployment of space weapons - "weaponised" space. Few states oppose the use of space for the military systems described above. The fact that some weapons pass through space - in the form of inter-continental ballistic missiles - is also accepted. However, space weaponisation is officially opposed by most states, including key states like Russia, Canada, China, Egypt, Brazil and the EU and it has the very real potential to provoke instability and weapons proliferation both on Earth and in space.

THE RULES
There are several generally ratified treaties pertaining to the uses of space and celestial bodies which together provide some elements of a rules-system for the use of Outer Space.

Outer Space Treaty 2
The key treaty and foundation of military space rules since its creation in 1967 is the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty has 96 States parties and contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the Moon or any other celestial body or otherwise station in outer space, any weapons of mass destruction, nuclear or otherwise. It limits activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to those for peaceful purposes and forbids the development of military bases, installations, fortifications or weapons testing of any kind on any celestial body. It also forbids the conducting of military manoeuvres from space and the claiming of any celestial body by any one state.

The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
In 1979 a similar treaty was published, and opened for signatures, which aimed to achieve the same rules for celestial bodies specifically. "The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" restated the demands of the Outer Space Treaty for the Moon to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and banned hostile acts on the Moon and the use of the Moon to commit hostile acts on the Earth, another body, spacecraft or any other object. The treaty banned the placing in orbit around the Moon of anything carrying nuclear weapons or other WMD and banned military manoeuvres on or in the Moon. Military bases, fortifications and installations were banned as was weapons testing on the Moon and again it was affirmed that activity on the Moon or other celestial bodies should be for the good of all mankind. However, probably because of its provisions prohibiting the ownership of natural real estate in space, the treaty was virtually ignored by the world community. Only nine countries have ratified it and just five others have signed it.

Further treaties have been presented and ratified, including treaties on the registering of objects launched into Outer Space 3 , agreements on the rescuing of astronauts 4 and rules on international liability for damage caused by man-made space objects 5. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 aimed more at controlling nuclear weapons proliferation than protection of Outer Space, but nonetheless this Treaty also recognised that space could be used for undesirable military projects. It banned the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere and beyond its limits, including outer space. What's more, the UN General Assembly has overwhelmingly passed resolutions each year since 1980 calling for the continued peaceful use of Outer Space, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to relevant existing treaties (PAROS).

However, there is a critical weakness in international law. Existing space law bans only weapons of mass destruction from space. A Weapon of Mass Destruction could best be defined as a destructive device unable to discriminate between military and civilian bodies whose effects can cause large numbers of casualties and/or large-scale material damage. This would include the nuclear bomb and most chemical and biological weapons. It would not realistically include anti-satellite weapons, space-based lasers or virtually any of the other space weapons being researched, developed or considered (detailed later).

The Outer Space Treaty has been overtaken by technology and its own limitations. Whilst the rules system developed by the Outer Space Treaty is solid, it does not apply to the generation of space weapons currently being considered. This means of course that new generations of space weapons could be developed and deployed without abrogating the Outer Space Treaty. However, more disturbingly, as a result of that loophole, it also means that there is currently no rules system whatsoever to oversee the development, deployment or use of "weapons of less destruction" (even though they may be devastatingly accurate) and non-WMD space weapons. In an international rules system where the development, trade in and use of every weapon and weapons system from the handgun to the nuclear bomb is constrained by law, this is a terrifyingly large legal gap

PART TWO

CAPABILITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Whilst the United States currently has the unrivalled dominance of military space capabilities, it is not alone in its ownership of military space hardware, its support of research programmes or its ambitions to develop and deploy space weapons. Furthermore, there are also other states which, although not currently possessing space weapons programmes, are nonetheless playing a role in their development.

WEAPONS

A brief summary of current and realistically likely space weapons would include:

Anti-Satellite weapons (ASATs): Any weaponry designed to destroy or disable satellites in orbit. These weapons can be ground-based (such as missiles, including the missile defence interceptor missiles), air-based (such as the Air-Borne laser currently under development and testing) or space-based.

Space-based ASATs would include:
- The space-based laser - a laser firing satellite, possibly powered by a nuclear generator
- Constellations of micro-satellites that act as space mines, parasites or mini-bombs
- Kinetic-energy weapons that fire objects at satellites which destroy or disable them with the force of impact.

The U.S. Air Force is also considering a whole range of projects for space warfare - their "Transformation Flight Plan" 6 gives a sweeping look at how to expand America's military space tool kit, including 7:

- A Small Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile: capable of intercepting satellites in low Earth orbit - a post 2015 development;
- A Counter Satellite Communications System: by 2010 to deny and disrupt any space-based communication and early warning systems;
- A Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System: to deny, disrupt and degrade space-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems;
- An Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement (EAGLE) Airship Relay Mirrors: to significantly extend the range of both the Airborne Laser and Ground-Based Laser by using space-based relay mirrors to achieve a range of effects from illumination to destruction;
- A Ground-Based Laser: to provide robust defensive and offensive space control capability to Low-Earth Orbit satellites post 2015;
- Hypervelocity Rod Bundles: Bundles of Tungsten Rods fired from orbiting platforms at a moment s notice toward earth at 3,700 meters per second, accurate to a range of 8 meters and able to destroy even the most hardened targets;
- A Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon: a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters with the ability to disrupt/destroy/disable as a non-kinetic anti-satellite weapon;
- Space-Based Space Surveillance System: a constellation of satellites to track and identify space forces in deep space to enable offensive and defensive counterspace operations.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States is undoubtedly the dominant force in military space usage; at the end of 2001 they had around 110 operational military-related satellites. Russia had around 40 such satellites and the rest of the world had around 20 8. The U.S. therefore accounts for well over two-thirds of all military satellites in orbit 9. The U.S. also has a dedicated space unit in its military - U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) - which is integral to current and future U.S. military space usage.

Although the current U.S. administration is more vocal in its ambitions and more active in its developments, U.S. research in to space weapons has been taking place for decades. Indeed, as the timeline shows, there have been U.S. research programmes on space weapons technology since the 1950s. In the 1960s they undertook research and development projects on ground-based anti-satellite weapons and in the 1980s work began on the development of an air-launched, anti-satellite system. President Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative - Star Wars - in 1982, and called for a system of land, sea, air and space based weapons to defend against missile attack. Research and development of space weapons technology has continued in the background in the U.S. military since the 1960s at least.

The U.S. Air Force Space Command's "Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond", published in 2003, discusses the potential of space weapons and "counterspace" operations. As the U.S. based Center for Defense Information (CDI) explain:

" & defensive 'counterspace' operations not only include attack detection and reporting but, in the roughly 2016 - 2028 timeframe, the deployment of 'active on-orbit protection' - which one must assume includes "shooting back" in some fashion at a potential or ongoing attack from another space-based object, although the Master Plan is less than clear on what exactly is being considered." 10

As already described, the U.S. has military space hardware that is capable of providing an array of information and communications facilities to war-planners and war-fighters and indeed the ability to collect and analyse information in peace time. As well as having the technological and financial capability to develop a space weapons programme, the United States administration is also edging towards development and deployment from a policy perspective. This is in no small part due to the fact that many of the world's leading advocates of space weaponisation are in the U.S. military and administration. These advocates include current Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, described by the Washington Post as "the leading proponent not only of national missile defenses but also of U.S. efforts to take control of space."

Much of the U.S.'s military space planning stems from a recognition - or at least a perception - that a country with such reliance on space assets has a potential weakness that could be exploited by an enemy. As Donald Rumsfeld said, "If the U.S. is to avoid a 'space Pearl Harbour,' it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems." 11 Such an attack could leave much of the U.S.'s military and civilian space assets unusable - weakening U.S. supremacy in space and on Earth and their ability to communicate, gather intelligence and strike back. The U.S. military therefore argue that space weapons would allow them to defend their space based systems.

However, there is another motive. As some of the quotes throughout this document demonstrate, there is a vocal and influential body within the U.S. administration that is keen to retain a military dominance of space. As the 1996 U.S. Space Command document "Vision for 2020" spelled out so forthrightly, that group seeks to achieve "dominance of space", "control of space" and the "ability to deny others access to space" 12. Vision for 2020 is now nearly ten years old but that desire is still very much alive. More recent examples of this thinking were displayed when the Chinese government put a man in space in 2003. In response, Lt Gen Edward Anderson, deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command, said "In my view it will not be long before space becomes a battleground." On the same day, Rich Haver - former assistant to Donald Rumsfeld and now Vice-President at U.S. arms corporation Northrop Grumman, said, "I believe space is the place we will fight in the next twenty years."

Current plans and rhetoric suggest that the United States is now preparing to step away from simple research and testing and be the first to cross the line to deployment:

NFIRE
In 2004, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency earmarked $68 million for a little known test satellite known as the Near Field Infrared Experiment or NFIRE. Publicly, its primary role is to gather data on exhaust plumes from rockets launched from earth, for the development of the boost phase intercept programme that forms part of the proposed missile defence system. However, in order to get as close as possible to the rocket plume of a missile, the satellite will be able to deploy a "kinetic kill vehicle" - a modified experimental warhead designed to disable or destroy objects travelling through low-Earth orbit (such as missiles or satellites) by impacting with them. As one anonymous senior government official and defense expert reported to United Press International, "We're crossing the Rubicon into space weaponization." The NFIRE is due to be launched this summer (2004). Whilst it is being marketed as a defensive system playing a part in the missile defence infrastructure, it could also be effectively developed as an anti-satellite weapon able to destroy the space assets of other countries.

ASATS
The U.S. and Russia have publicly worked on several Anti-Satellite (ASAT) projects for the last 50 years. The first projects were developed in the 1960s although the effectiveness of these systems was not tested. In the 1980s the primary ASAT system for the U.S. was the Air-launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV). The U.S. tested the ALMV system against a satellite in October 1985 13. However, in 1986 the U.S. imposed a ban on the testing of the ALMV on targets in space. (The Soviet Union had declared a moratorium on testing ASAT systems in 1983.)

In 1988 the U.S. Congress voted against extending a unilateral ban on ASATs and development started on new ASAT systems. Between 1989 and 1990 the U.S. developed and created the MIRACL ground-based laser ASAT, largely in response to intelligence that the Soviet Union had created a similar system. In fact, on an official U.S. visit to the Soviet Union in 1989 it became apparent that the Soviet system was no threat, being a long way from completion, and so in 1991 the U.S. Congress banned the use of the MIRACL laser against objects in space.

At the same time the U.S. army was developing a ground-based kinetic energy ASAT (KE-ASAT) - a system that could fire objects (missiles) from the ground that would damage satellites using simply the energy gained through the motion power of the interception. This project was terminated in 1993, but was resurrected in 1996 with £30 million of funding. Funding continued until 2002 but interest seems to be declining in the system.

In 1996 the ban on using the MIRACL against space targets lapsed and in 1997 the U.S. Air Force took the opportunity to test the system by firing its laser at a satellite 420km above the Earth. Although the Pentagon justified this as an attempt to see if U.S. satellites could withstand attacks by lasers this was in reality a full test of a laser ASAT.

Currently, the KE-ASAT would need much more funding and testing before it could become operational. The ALMV has not been tested and there appears to be no interest in reviving the system at the moment. The MIRACL laser has not been tested since 1997 and its capabilities are unknown. There may of course be further ASAT systems under development or even at an operational stage but they are not in the public arena.

Since the George W. Bush presidency started there have been increases in funding and support for ASAT and related weaponry. For example, the Pentagon asked for $82.6 million for counterspace technologies in fiscal year 2004 and a total of $325.2 million between up to 2009 14. Increased funding and political support has been given to the development of technology to improve the ability to track space objects, the development of miniature satellites, sensors and kill vehicles, for research and development into high-energy lasers and the development of full working systems (such as the NFIRE described above).

Missile defence
Much of the development of space-based technology and weaponry has taken place in the name of Missile Defence. The U.S. Missile Defence system under development now is an ambitious plan to develop land, sea, air and space-based components that together can spot, track and destroy missiles as they travel towards the U.S. mainland (and eventually other areas of the world too). The system is extremely controversial as it has the potential to lead to space weapons deployment. It is also perceived by some to negate the apparent deterrent effect of limited nuclear weapons arsenals, thus possibly provoking further proliferation by states that feel a need to overcome the system.

- The NFIRE - the first space weapon - is being justified as a defensive measure capable of intercepting incoming missiles, although its ASAT capabilities and so its position as a space weapon, are clear.
- The development of improved space tracking facilities in space and on the ground (such as the upgraded Fylingdales radar in North Yorkshire, the development of the X-band radar and the creation of a new satellite surveillance and tracking system - also known as the Space Based Infra Red System or SBIRS - that will send data to the U.S. via Menwith Hill in North Yorkshire) are also integral to missile defence but could be used for ASAT projects.
- Interceptor missiles for the Ground-based Midcourse Defence element of Missile Defence, designed - we are told - to hit and intercept incoming missiles, would be able to hit and destroy satellites in low-earth orbit 15 with as much if not greater ease.
- The air-borne laser - a high powered laser fitted to a modified Boeing 747 which is being developed and tested now - is capable of intercepting missiles and destroying, or at least blinding, satellites 16.
- And the Space-Based Laser - currently several years from completion but nonetheless still in development - would be just as successful as an ASAT system as it would an anti-missile system.

It is highly likely that the air-borne and space-based lasers would be capable of attacking any object in space and of firing down on to the Earth as well - making them much more than an ASAT system. Given the widespread concerns that missile defence won't work effectively, the statements issued by the U.S. administration and military about controlling space and the ASAT capabilities of the missile defence system, it is no wonder that many states and individuals believe the system is being developed primarily for offence rather than defence.

Other projects
FALCON: (Force Application and Launch from Continental U.S.A.)17
Consisting of a Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle, an unmanned bomber capable of flying outside the atmosphere at high speed and reaching any target on Earth within 2 hours;

The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) 18
An expendable and future reusable Military Space Plane [MSP] system with the ability to deploy multiple payload types from and through space to a terrestrial target;

The Moon
George W. Bush's announcement in January 2004 of plans to set up a lunar station on the Moon came as something of a surprise to much of the world. If this lunar station proves to be more than an election ploy and if it were to be an entirely American operation then it would certainly test the spirit if not the letter of the Outer Space Treaty, which forbids the claiming or taking of celestial bodies by any one nation. Such a lunar station would also have obvious military potential as a base for the launching, testing or use of space weaponry. Whether or not such a base would play such a role is unclear, but a military lunar station would certainly break the Outer Space Treaty, which bans the creation of military installations on celestial bodies.

Micro-satellites
The United States is also known to be keen on the military potential of micro-satellites (MS). The development and testing of MS is ongoing, including a test where a XSS-10 MS autonomously manoeuvred around another space object and photographed it 19. Such manoeuvrable mini-satellites have a clear ASAT capability and this is recognised by the Air Force, whose funding for research in this area is increasing.

The United States has abstained from the annual UN General Assembly declaration of intention to keep space for peaceful purposes and has vetoed Russian, Chinese and Canadian attempts to reach a treaty banning space weapons.

RUSSIA

Russia was of course the other half of the cold war and so unsurprisingly has a history of military space development. In 2004 Russia announced the formation of the Russian Military Space Force 20 in an attempt to place space back in to Russian military strategic planning. Its main mission at present appears to be the development and use of military satellites for guidance, communication and intelligence, as opposed to the development of space weapons. Furthermore, over recent years Russia has been one of the main proponents of a global ban on the deployment of weapons in Outer Space.

History and ASATs
Russia was the first nation to put a satellite in space and the first to put a man in space. It has the second largest number of military satellites in space after the USA and it has a cold war history of investigating space weapons and space battle stations. Its main progress on space weaponry to date has, like the USA, been focussed on ASATs.

In the 1960s Russia developed an operational missile defence system by surrounding Moscow with nuclear-tipped inter-continental ballistic missiles - called "Galosh". These missiles would in theory have been able to boost in to space, detonate and destroy any incoming missiles outside the atmosphere. The system was never tested and was not a preferred method of defence as the detonation would also destroy all other space systems in the vicinity, including Soviet satellites. Nonetheless, for that same reason, the system would have had ASAT capabilities.

The main ASAT system developed by Russia, which remains their only fully developed system, is the "Co-orbital ASAT" - a set of missiles armed with conventional explosives which can be launched when a target satellite's ground track rises above the launch site. Once launched it is placed in orbit close to that of the target and within one or two orbits the ASAT interceptor can manoeuvre closer, guided by onboard radar, and then dive toward it, detonating and destroying it. The interceptor is thought to be effective when detonated within a kilometre of the target, though it can approach a satellite to within tens of meters.

Initial tests between 1963-1972 confirmed that the system could work and so it was declared operational. The Soviets temporarily ceased testing the system after signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972". Testing resumed in 1976 and continued until 1982. The system is thought to be operational although tests are not known to have taken place since 1982. 21

As described previously, it was thought that the Soviets were developing a ground-based laser ASAT in the 1980s, but an inspection by American scientists at the invitation of the Soviets, showed that this system was massively over-hyped and not a genuine threat. Russian developments of space military equipment from this point onwards appear to extend only as far as "militarisation" (as opposed to "weaponisation"). In other words, developments have taken place on communications, espionage and tracking systems but not noticeably on weapons systems.

Manoeuvrable Missiles
In 2004 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a warhead capable of manoeuvring whilst in orbit. The warhead, which would detach from an inter-continental ballistic missile, could be nuclear-tipped if desired and, crucially, may be able to out-manoeuvre the U.S. missile defence system. Whilst Russia announced that the development was not in response to missile defence, it is hard to see another reason for such a development - particularly when Russia is known to be wary about the U.S. project. If the warheads are able to out-manoeuvre the interceptor missiles that would be fired as part of the ground-based midcourse missile defence or Aegis cruiser interceptor systems, then the U.S. may feel inclined to resort more quickly to space-based elements of missile defence. However, as the warheads are manoeuvrable, they also have an obvious anti-satellite capability.

Russia is seen to be eager to avoid a new space race with the United States - a race that it cannot afford. It has made many statements opposing the placing of weapons in space and has jointly or unilaterally presented elements of treaties and proposals for space weapons bans to the Conference on Disarmament, none of which have been successfully adopted. They also support the annual PAROS declaration at the UN General Assembly and have suggested that all the major space states declare a joint moratorium on space weapons deployment, stating that Russia " "is ready to assume such an obligation right away if the leading space powers join this moratorium". 22

CHINA

China put its first person in space - the third country to do so - on October 15th 2003 but its space history goes back to 1970, when it launched its first satellite. Between then and the launching of its first "taikonaut" China has conducted 79 launches, of which 67 were successful. Most of these launches were of communications, weather, remote sensing, navigation and scientific satellites, although some may have had a dual military-civilian purpose. 23

China is expected to attempt to put another person in space within a couple of years and Chinese officials often speak of a three step plan for space - put humans in space, dock spacecraft together to form a small workspace and finally build a large space station. On May 18th 2004 Agence France-Presse reported the leading designer of China's space programme, Wang Yongzhi, as saying that the country will launch its own permanent manned space station within 15 years. 24 China has also stated its aims to launch a lunar satellite in 2006 and land an unmanned craft on the Moon in 2010. Its next manned space mission, the "Shenzhou VI", will be launched in 2005. In the same announcement Yongzhi stated that China no longer aims to build a permanent lunar station - something that would have caused considerable tensions as the U.S. have similar aims.

A 2000 White Paper by the Chinese Government states China's aims as,

"to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes, promote mankind's civilization and social progress, and benefit the whole of mankind; and to meet the growing demands of economic construction, national security, science and technology development and social progress, protect China's national interests and build up the comprehensive national strength." 25

The Chinese have never openly stated ambitions to create or deploy space weapons. Indeed, like Russia, the Chinese government has been extremely vocal about its attempts to keep space for peace and has proposed elements of treaties for a space weapons ban at the Conference on Disarmament. The launch of its first taikonaut was said by China to be a sign of its support for the peaceful exploration of space.

However, there are increasing signs that China and the U.S. - mistrustful of each other's ambitions for space - are squaring up for what would be a disastrously destabilising arms race in space. Just as the Chinese view missile defence as being primarily aimed at making their nuclear arsenal redundant, so the U.S. sees Chinese attempts to create a treaty banning space weapons as an attempt to reduce the U.S. lead and allow time for the Chinese to catch up.

China is developing fast. Its economy is improving, it is now a member of the World Trade Organisation and it is the most highly populated country on Earth. The U.S. sees China as a major threat to its position of superpower, particularly in the Pacific region, and is worried both that its current domination of space may be threatened and that the space systems it so heavily relies on are becoming more vulnerable. According to Lt Col Mark Stokes, "China plans to use space weapons in a war against Taiwan and, having studied U.S. military uses of space, is covertly developing space weapons whilst advocating a treaty to ban them." 26 The 2003 Pentagon report on Chinese military power stated "China's Leaders probably view ASATs - and offensive counterspace systems in general - as well as space-based missile defences as inevitabilities In addition to passive counterspace measures - such as denial and deception - China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active ASAT capability." 27

In support of the opinion that China is increasingly interested in the military potential of space, and as an explanation for the U.S.'s increasing concern over what Donald Rumsfeld called a "space Pearl Harbour" Chinese defence analyst Wang Hucheng observed in 2000, "For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space systems may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of this reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for military action." 28

China's space programme is certainly ambitious, with an annual budget of U.S.$2 billion and a new "China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation" set up in 1999 to oversee national defence and aerospace work. On top of its satellite launches, China joined the European Galileo project in 2003 - which is aimed at establishing a Global Positioning System to rival that of the U.S..

According to the Pentagon report, China will be capable of launching a "direct-ascent" ASAT in two to six years. It is also believed that China may be working on the development of micro-satellites that are able to attach themselves to target satellites and destroy or jam them. Evidence for this comes mainly from discussions and publications in a variety of Chinese journals 29. What's more, the People's Liberation Army states, "whoever has control (or 'hegemony') over space, will also have the ability to help or hinder and affect 'ground' mobility and air, sea and space combat." 30

Missile Defence is causing the Chinese much concern and it is perceived by them and several other states to be primarily aimed at controlling Chinese military power. The U.S. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China in 2003 31 stated openly that China is expanding its nuclear arsenal and that it is doing so in part as a reaction to the threat to its deterrent capability posed by missile defence. The U.S. Missile Defence system then has provoked early limited proliferation of nuclear weapons. It threatens to provoke further proliferation and expansion by the development of space weaponry.

In fact, the status of Chinese developments and their ambitions for the military use of space is confusing. It is likely that the Chinese are most interested in, and probably actively pursuing, the development of ASAT and satellite jamming technology that could interfere with U.S. capabilities in space. Certainly China recognises the usefulness of a military space programme and is concerned about the power that the U.S. currently has through its dominance of the military space arena. And certainly it is keen to achieve a ban on the deployment of space weapons. However, whether such a ban is aimed at slowing U.S. progress or whether that is something the U.S. are claiming to justify an early deployment of space weapons is unclear.

INDIA

In October 2003 India also joined with Europe to help develop the Galileo Global Positioning System, investing £210 million in the network of 30 orbiting satellites. India has been launching its own satellites since 1980 and has a number of satellites in orbit, including the Indian-built Insat-3C. The former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 32 also recognised that space is more than a prestige tool. In July 2003 he was quoted as saying:

"Successful utilisation of space technology can be an instrument for enhancing our global role, not through military power but through development and economic growth." 33

India has also publicly stated its ambitions to create and deploy space weapons. As Indian Air Force chief S Krishnaswamy said in October 2003, only three months after the Indian Prime Minister's statement quoted above:

"Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapon platforms in space and killer satellites &. IAF has started work on conceptualising such a weapons systems and its operational command system." 34

That conceptual work, it turned out, was the start of development of an aerospace command station to control space-based nuclear weapons platforms - something that would undoubtedly break the Outer Space Treaty. The driving force was India's desire to show a formidable retaliatory capability in case of a nuclear attack - primarily by Pakistan. However, India is at least publicly committed to a ban on space weapons and, like China, Russia, Canada and some European states, is pressing for negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament to develop a treaty for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).

India has also been very keen to support U.S. missile defence developments. India initially wanted to acquire the US-Israeli Arrow-2 missile defence system but that deal was broken when the U.S. decided that such a procurement would affect the balance of power with neighbouring Pakistan. However, the U.S. did consider a Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defence system to be acceptable and India is expected to implement the system with U.S. help in the near future. If India does indeed play a key role in the U.S. global missile defence architecture by providing systems in Asia then should missile defence progress to space weapons deployment, India may follow suit. Such a move is bound to further provoke Pakistan and China.

OTHER COUNTRIES

There is no evidence to suggest that any other countries are heavily involved or openly ambitious about a desire to acquire space weapons. However a few are playing a significant role.. For example Australia, Germany, Israel, Japan, Poland and the UK are amongst those states that are supportive of U.S. Missile Defence and are willing to offer the use of current facilities or host new facilities as part of the system's architecture. As mentioned previously, space-based weapons elements of the Missile Defence system are planned for the future and the first of these - the NFIRE - may even be deployed in 2004.

The UK, France, Israel, Canada, Australia and Sweden also have active research in to micro-satellites. These satellites can be readily applied to ASAT use. The EU is rapidly developing its Space Agency and although it currently declares that its ambitions are non-military it has not declared outright its opposition to space weapons - a move that would be helpful in the move to keep space for peace.

The United Kingdom
The UK does have a limited military space programme. For example, the military has an independent space-based imaging capability. The UK is due to launch a remote sensing micro-satellite later this year (2004) which has been jointly funded by the British National Space Centre (BNSC) and the Ministry of Defence. With a 2.5-meter resolution as well as the capacity to send down images to receivers on Earth it is potentially an extremely useful military device for providing the UK military with "situational awareness." Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd is a world leader in micro-satellite technology and their products also have the capacity to be used as kinetic energy anti-satellite devices.

Currently, Britain's main military space assets are the pair of Skynet 4 communications satellites but they are due to be replaced by the Skynet 5 series by 2008. It is not inconceivable that the UK could move towards acquiring space weapons, whether it be through the use of micro-satellites or the development of a space-plane. Disappointingly, as yet, the UK has not openly stated its opposition to space weapons.

The European Space Agency
The European Space Agency (ESA) was formed from the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) in 1973. It was formed independently from the European Union (EU) and its activities were limited by its founding charter to the pursuit of space programs for peaceful purposes. However, towards the end of 2000 a three member advisory panel, set up by ESA director general to help determine the future of ESA, recommended that ESA evolve into an organisation capable of building military and civilian hardware at the request of the EU. 35 The report clearly positioned Europe as the counterpart and "equal partner" of the U.S. in terms of the strategic goals of "dominance in space" and "information superiority" by stating:

"By developing its own infrastructure, Europe will ...prevent other competitors (from Asia in particular) from developing their own infrastructure. By doing that Europe will become the alternative to the U.S. for the world, will consolidate its number 2 position in space and will therefore be able to become a privileged partner on global issues and large-scale international developments."

The U.S. is not in favour of an independent European space programme and has tried to discourage its development - it wants the rapid growth of a military space sector in Europe to be controlled by NATO. Europe on the other hand, is wary of the pre-emptive, somewhat "go it alone" strategy of the current Bush administration and feels the need for independence from the U.S..

A 2003 European White Paper, adopted by the European Parliament in January 2004, paves the way for the EU to further develop a military space capability. "Space: a new European frontier for an expanding Union" 36 clearly states that "In addition to supporting a wide range of civil policies, space systems can also provide direct contributions to the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and its European Security and Defence Policy." It goes on to describe an action plan to further develop the GALILEO satellite global positioning system (with the participation of China), the implementation of a global monitoring and earth observation system (GMES) and the use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles - which are playing an increasingly important role in 'battlespace information dominance').

In a response to the recent U.S. space plans, European Research Commissioner Philippe Busquin stated: "Europe is now moving towards its own Security Research programme. & The fact is that Europe has long been handicapped in this area due to the fact that security has been a 'no-go' area for us. Space will clearly be a major contributor and benefactor as we move into this important area of research."

ESA Director General Jean-Jacques Dordain is part of the group that is keen to develop a new European Security Research Programme. He was reported in February 2004 as saying: "Now, more than ever, Space is seen as a major security asset, but in fact the distinction between defence-related and civil space systems makes little sense today. The same satellites, the same systems can be used for both. In the U.S., defence is the main driving force behind the development of space systems that offer important civil benefits. In our case, we will undoubtedly be funding systems through our civil institutions that play a major role in European security and defence."

Many members of the EU Parliament oppose moves toward more military space investment.

PART THREE

THE IMPLICATIONS

As the above shows, there are very serious implications for the deployment of space weapons. A destabilising space arms race is a realistic prospect if the current situation is allowed to continue. At present at least two of the major space-capable states are mistrustful of each other and are quite possibly gearing up for such a space race. One (the U.S.) has a policy to dominate space and the other (China) recognises the potential for disabling states that are too reliant on space systems. Other states are less able to enter in to an ambitious space race but are nonetheless keen to exploit the military potential of space. And at present there are absolutely no rules to ban deployment or even to oversee deployment. There is simply no suitable rules system for the non-WMD weaponisation of Outer Space. This lack of a rules system is partly responsible for the mistrust and insecurity. A treaty is urgently needed to provide such a rules system and secure some stability.

The development or deployment of anti-satellite weapons is only prevented by voluntary unilateral policies. The development of space weapons that can target the Earth and/or satellites is not covered by law and so is only held back because of political will and technological limitations. But political will is changing in key space-capable states and their technological capability is rapidly advancing.

The United States plans to develop and deploy the NFIRE in 2004 and to continue to pursue a policy of space domination. In the current political context, such a move could develop into a number of possible scenarios. Other states may attempt to follow the U.S. lead and develop and deploy space weapons - thereby provoking a possible space arms race. Alternatively, other states may not attempt to develop space-based weaponry but may opt instead to concentrate on developing ground and air-based anti-satellite technology that can attack and disable space-based systems.

Whether or not these situations develop the deployment of space weapons may still provoke ground-based nuclear proliferation. States (space-capable or not) that feel that the deployment of space weapons threatens the force of their military defensive infrastructure may respond by increasing (or creating) their nuclear arsenal as a form of deterrent. A large nuclear arsenal would be hard to destroy completely by a first strike attack and/or the use of space weaponry and could probably pierce the limited U.S. missile defence shield being developed. Vertical nuclear proliferation (the expansion and modernisation of a nuclear arsenal by a nuclear state) could also provoke horizontal proliferation (the creation of a nuclear arsenal by a non-nuclear state) and so threaten the very existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all the disarmament efforts of the past few decades.

Of course, the other outcome of the deployment of space weapons is that space becomes a battleground, or "the fourth medium of warfare" as U.S. Space Command calls it 37. As well as the proliferation and instability issues, 'war in, through and/or from space' threatens to change the near Earth environment in outer space. The debris created by any actual war in space could prevent future space missions from ever leaving the Earth. At the speeds required to escape the Earth's gravitational pull, the impact of just a tiny object could be disastrous and there are major concerns about the amount of space junk already in orbit 38. A conflict in space would add to this problem enormously 39.

Also at risk are the peaceful activities (commercial, scientific and academic) currently undertaken in Outer Space. Much of the Western world benefits from improved communication, resource information, global positioning and weather prediction available from current space assets. The developing world too benefits from weather prediction and studies of future weather patterns and erosion. We will in essence move away from seeing space as an investigative and informative arena for the benefit of humanity and turn it into a competitive arena for the dominance and control of one nation - with the distinct possibility of polluting the final frontier to an extent where we will be unable to 'boldly go' through it.

ALTERNATIVE ACTION

We are currently in a situation where there is no international rules system banning the development, deployment or use of non-WMD space weapons. Canada, Russia, China, India and some European states have all supported proposed elements of treaties at the Conference on Disarmament and all, along with most of the rest of the world, have supported the annual PAROS declaration at the UN General Assembly. However, the United States has always refused to move from discussion to negotiation and has never supported the PAROS declaration. It is essential that the UK commit itself to supporting the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and puts its weight behind calls for such a treaty. The backing of the UK would add considerable momentum as it is influential with both the E.U. and U.S..

The United Kingdom should:

1) Declare its opposition to the development or deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite weapons
2) Declare a moratorium on the development or deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite weapons, including a ban on helping other countries to develop or deploy such weapons
3) Urge other nations within the EU to declare a moratorium on the development and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite weapons
4) Take a leading role in negotiating a multi-lateral, verifiable treaty banning the development or deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite weapons or in negotiating additional protocols to the current Outer Space Treaty that would achieve the same aims.

As Rebecca Johnson of the Disarmament and Arms Control Programme at the Liu Insitute for Global Issues wrote,
"It would be foolish to wait until the first weapons were deployed & and then try to establish a retrospective non-proliferation or disarmament regime in space. Much better to seize the early initiative to take preventive and precautionary measures &" 40

Such moves are realistic, achievable and essential. Space is currently home to an array of commercial and scientific endeavours. If space is to evolve in to the new battleground, we could well be prevented from ever leaving the planet again and will most certainly put at risk a unique resource for information, understanding and commerce to replace it with a debris strewn field for nothing more than dominance, destabilisation and destruction.

References
1 As reported in the Santa Barbara News, 23rd April 2003
2 The full name of this treaty is " Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".
3 Convention on Registration of objects launched into Outer Space, 1975 - 44 parties.
4 Limited Test Ban Treaty 1963 - 117 parties
5 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972 - 82 parties
6 The USAF TFP, a 176-page document, can be accessed through a link on the USAF's home page at www.af.mil or on the office of force transformation web site at www.oft.osd.mil .
7 See also: "USAF Transformation Flight Plan Highlights Space Weapons" by Center for Defense Information, February 19,2004 - http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2080
8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
9 http://wwww.cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/sipriconcern.htm
10 "Developments in Military Space: Movement toward space weapons?, by Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information, pg 3
11 From Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 2001 - the commission was headed by Donald Rumsfeld - available from: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html
12 U.S. Space Command "Vision for 2020" - available from http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/
13 The U.S. tested the ALMV against an ageing Solwind satellite in a 555km orbit on 13th October 1985
14 Jeffrey Lewis, "Lift Off for Space Weapons: Implications of the Department of Defense's 2004 Budget Request for Space Weaponisation", July 2003, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland, College Park, MD., pg 15
15 Union of concerned scientists: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1152
16 Union of concerned scientists: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1152
17 "Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON)", Program Manager: Dr. Steven Walker -see http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/falcon.html - see also article by Global Security at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/hcv.htm
18 "X-41 Common Aero Vehicle (CAV)", Federation of American Scientists Space Policy Project, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/launch/x-41.htm
19 Theresa Hitchens and Jeffrey Lewis, "Arms Race in Space?" U.S. Air /force Quietly Focuses on Space Control", Defense News, Sept 1 2003
20 http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=22927
21 " A History of U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs" - Laura Grego, Union of Concerned Scientists
22 http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2003/U.S.-Russian-Arms-Race8aug03.htm
23 "China's Space Program: An Overview" by Marcia S. Smith - www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=11007
24 http://www.spacedaily.com/2004/040518060157.b9i1mcrm.html
25 "China's Space Activities, a White Paper" November 2000 - www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov.22.2000.html
26 http://www.cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/chinaurgesban.htm
27 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 28, 2003), p. 32,
28 Wang Hucheng "The U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs" and Strategic Weaknesses" - Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, July 5th 2000
29 For example, see Missiles and Space Vehicles (Daodan yu Hangtian Yunzhi Jishu), Zheng Qinghui and Zhang Yulin, "Liyong GPS Queding Diguidao Xiao Weixing Zitai," Daodan yu Hangtian Yunzhai Jishu, No. 2, 2002, pp. 41-45 or the Wen Wei Po newspaper on April 12 2003
30 Hong Bing, et. al., "Taikong Wuqihua-Yige Weixian de Xinhao (The Weaponization of Space-A call to the Danger)," Jiefangjun Bao, www.pladaily.com, December 12, 2001.
31 See 25
32 Vajpayee lost power in the Arpil/May 2004 general election - it is yet to be seen what space policies the Congress party will develop or declare.
33 Press Trust of India, July 3rd 2003
34 Indian Air Force chief S Krishnaswamy, October 6th 2003: http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/06iaf1.htm
35 "Joint ESA/EC Document on a European Strategy for Space" - Annes II to the Report "Towards a Space Agency for the European Union" - available from http://ravel.esrin.esa.it/docs/wisemen_report.pdf (accessed June 2004)
36 Available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/whitepaper/pdf/spwhpap_en.pdf
37 U.S. Space Command "Vision for 2020"
38 See for example: "Will space junk bring down the space initiative ?" by Jeffrey F. Bell, March 16, 2004 - http://www.spacedaily.com/news/spacetravel-04i.html
39 "Star Wars could make space unusable", New Scientist, 19 April 2002 - http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99992188
40 Missile Defence and the Weaponisation of Space, by Rebecca Johnson, published by ISIS, Jan 2003 (ISIS Policy Paper on Ballistic Missile Defence, No 11)