6 - 1 U.S. Nuclear Weapon Monopoly (1945-1960)

The U.S. emerged from World War II virtually unscathed and in exclusive possession of the atomic bomb. A twice-demonstrated willingness to use this frightful weapon, gave the U.S. great political leverage in the post-war settlement with the Soviet Union of their respective zones of dominance. President Truman of the United States believed that the Soviet Union would never be able to make an atomic bomb. He did not hesitate to use the threat of U.S. atomic bombs. In March 1946, only eight months after World War II ended, President Truman threatened the Soviets with the atom bomb over the Soviet occupation of the Azerbaijan province of northwest Iran.(Kaku 1987, p.32) Soviet forces withdrew. Similar threats lay behind U.S. dominance in the Yugoslav crisis in November 1946 and the far more serious Berlin I crisis (24 June 1948-30 September 1949). The terminal event of this period came on 3 September 1949 when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. The American monopoly of atomic bomb know-how had lasted barely four years.

Although the Soviets exploded their first atom bomb on 3 September 1949, it would be several years before the day came when they could mount a dangerous attack.. The U.S. military calculated that this day would be in 1954 and named it “A-Day.” Presidents Truman and Eisenhower came under great pressure from the military to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War (Crisis #4, June 1950-July 1953), the Dien Bien Phu siege (Crisis#5, 8 March-19 June 1954) and even in the China I crisis over Quemoy & Matsu islands (Crisis# 6, September 1954-May 1955) by which time the new Soviet Bear and Bison bombers, for the first time, put the U.S.A. in range of attack. By 1955, the Soviets had approximately 200 strategic nuclear weapons.

U.S. unwillingness to accept that their nuclear weapon monopoly was at an end, made the final stages of this period the second most dangerous period in human history. It took the very dangerous Berlin III Crisis (Crisis# 10, 13 July-17 October 1961) and finally the terrifying Cuban missile crisis (Crisis# 11, 14-28 October, 1962) for the new reality to sink in: By 1962 the Soviets had 3,322 nuclear weapons. Nuclear war meant Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The date used here for the start of the MAD period, 1960, indicates the date when this destruction was possible, rather than when it was recognized and accepted.

6 - 2 Mutually Assured Destruction (1960-1974)

Following the Cuban missile crisis there was a seven year period (1962-1969) during which there were no nuclear crises. However, this period of uneasy stability was under steady erosion. The U.S. made a determined push to upset the strategic balance in its favour by building an unanswerable first strike nuclear attack capability against the Soviet Union. This idea was proposed by Defense Secretary McNamara on 11 June 1962:

“ (A)...principal military objective(s) in the event of a nuclear war...should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces...”

The destruction of the enemies missiles and bombers came to be known as “Counterforce.” This, essentially, is the ideal form of ballistic missile defence, since it destroys almost all of the adversary’s missiles before they are even launched. Since this destruction was never likely to be complete, a defensive shield to protect the U.S.A. from those few Soviet missiles that had survived the Counterforce First Strike, was an essential component of a U.S. First Strike capability. A ballistic missile defence (BMD) system was therefore a “mopping-up” system, following a massive Counterforce First Strike. It is very important to realize that a BMD system that can reliably “mop-up” all of the antagonist’s few approaching missiles that survive a Counterforce First Strike, is essential to make the threat of a First Strike credible, and for this threat to be a useful tool of political dominance. This is the essential role of a U.S. BMD system. Both the Russians and the Chinese understand this very clearly.

It is still widely believed that U.S. military and political leaders still operate under an essentially passive Mutually Assured Destruction policy of massive deterrence capability. It is not widely realized that the U.S. has pursued very aggressive and dangerous nuclear war fighting policies since 1974. Ballistic Missile Defence has been an essential component of these policies and remains so to the present.

The U.S. decision to end the strategic balance of mutually assured destruction and to plunge ahead with programs for Counterforce and nuclear war fighting came in January 1974 when President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242.

6 - 3 First Strike Capability Goal (1974-Present)

An unanswerable first strike capability has long been the goal of U.S. strategic nuclear war planners. The technological difficulties were enormous, the cost of overcoming them astronomical. President Nixon’s NSDM 242 put the program in high gear.

There were two technological advances which brought the possibility of a very efficient Counterforce strike much closer. The first of these advances was in the miniaturization of warheads. This made it possible for up to seventeen warheads to be packed into the nose cone of a missile. This missile could act as a “bus” that dropped off its warhead “passengers” close to their targets along its route

The second advance was an enormous increase in warhead accuracy. This was achieved by enabling these warheads to manoeuvre by make fine-tuning adjustments to their path, after leaving the bus, by a combination of precise position fixes, using the Navstar satellite system in deep space. (Aldridge 1983, p.124) The “bus” rocket with its Manoeuverable Advanced Re-entry Vehicle warheads is known as a MARV’d missile. The huge number of accurately placed warheads, that this makes possible, was essential for a Counterforce knock-out of Soviet strategic missiles dispersed in hardened silos, submarines, mobile launchers and bomber aircraft.

Using 17 MARVs per missile

...“it would require only seven Trident submarines to wipe out all but 140 of the Soviet Union’s land based strategic missiles. ...A ...”second salvo would require only one more submarine load of missiles and would destroy all but fourteen of the remaining silos. A second salvo wouldn’t be necessary, however, once the U.S. deploys the ballistic missile defense system currently under development.”

(Aldridge 1983, p.97)

First strike capability was given clear definition in President Carter’s Presidential Directives, starting with PD 18 of 24 August 1977 and ending with PD 59 of 25 July 1980. This proposed capability had four components:

1. Anti Satellite (ASAT): ASAT weapons are launched to knock out the Soviet warning system.
2. Decapitation: Destruction of Soviet leadership by very accurate Pershing IIs.
3. Counterforce: Destruction of almost all of the Soviet missiles in hardened silos, submarines, mobile launchers and the strategic bomber fleet by MX & Trident II (D-5) missiles.
4. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or 'Star Wars: A ballistic missile defence system to mop up any Soviet missiles that somehow survived Counterforce and had been launched.

   (Kaku, 1987, p.195)

This last and essential component was tightly limited by the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty of 3 October 1972 between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. This prohibition did not prevent intense research into designing and building a reliable shield.

The importance of a SDI (Star Wars, ABM, BMD) type shield in a First Strike capability was admitted by Lt. Col. Robert Bowman, U.S. Air Force director, who directed the search for such a shield under President Carter. He called it“...the missing link to a First Strike.” (Kaku 1987, p.242).

This section has attempted to show that a ballistic missile defence had an essential role in a credible First Strike capability during the Cold War. The next and final section will consider the situation since the end of the Cold War.