The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has been working to install a missile-defense site in Turkey. The MDA’s Web site states that the defense site would “ensure common security” by providing protection from intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missiles and long-range North Korean missiles. The proposal, known as the European Capability Initiative, has been stalled by Russia due to Russia’s security concerns. Although the MDA claims that the European Capability Initiative would be unable to intercept these missiles, Russian officials are skeptical and opposed to the site. To delay the site, Russia has threatened to target some of their nuclear warheads to European cities and withdraw from a cold war treaty banning mid-range nuclear weapons.

Postol, a professor in the Science, Technology, and Society program at MIT, says that the U.S. claim that the European Capability Initiative cannot intercept Russian missiles is incorrect. Postol discussed his research at an Aug. 28 Capitol Hill briefing through the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In his presentation, “Postol said that the MDA has overstated the speed of Russian ICBMs by 15% and underestimated the speed of proposed new U.S. interceptor missiles by 30%,” according to an AAAS press release from Monday, Sept. 24.

The MDA posted a response to Postol’s criticisms on its Web site on Thursday, Sept. 27. The agency “stands by its figures which are real, not hypothetical and are derived from actual hardware and software performance data from actual flight tests.” The response goes on to state that “Dr. Postol’s calculations are overly optimistic and do not accurately reflect detection, tracking and fire control solution times; acceleration profiles from our flight tests, with actual payload weights and propellant performance; minimum delta velocities required to destroy the targets; and what we know about Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).”

Postol was also skeptical of the necessity of a European missile-defense site. “There appears to be no credible technical reason that the stated U.S. objective to defend against … Iranian ICBMs could not be fulfilled by other types of deployment configurations,” said Postol, according to the AAAS press release. “It is therefore understandable that Russian military analysts might suspect that U.S. motivations are different from those that have been stated,” said Postol.

The U.S. has made little progress in persuading Russia otherwise, according to reporting on Sunday, Oct. 13 from The New York Times.

Postol is no stranger to controversy or to the field of missile defense.

In 1992, Postol made headlines during Operation Desert Storm when he criticized the Army’s Patriot Missile program. The Army claimed that the missiles were very successful at intercepting Iraqi missiles, and revolutionized parts of warfare. Postol’s analysis and subsequent testimony in front of a US House committee showed that the Patriot missiles were actually extremely inaccurate, hitting their targets less than 10 percent of the time.

In 2000, Postol was the center of a controversy involving national missile defense, when he was provided with a copy of a redacted report discussing the effectiveness of a missile sensor. According to Postol’s interpretation, the reports indicated that MIT and the Lincoln Laboratory were conducting fraudulent research and exaggerating the capabilities of a missile sensor. A long debate followed Postol’s accusations, during which the military restricted some MIT attempts to investigate the accusations, and Postol accused the military of covering up research fraud. The accusations culminated in an investigation by the Department of Defense (excluding MIT for security reasons) that determined there was no research fraud.

For more information, visit The Tech’s archives, at http://www-tech.mit.edu/V127/N15/dodreport.html.
 

That view supports Russia's criticism of the system. Russia adamantly opposes the plan and the dispute has escalated U.S.-Russian tensions to the highest point since the Cold War.

The Pentagon agency overseeing the missile program, the Missile Defense Agency, rejects the scientists' claims, saying their analyses are flawed. The United States says the missile system is intended to counter a threat from Iran and could not take out Russian missiles. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has dismissed Russia's concerns as "ludicrous."

But the six scientists -- whose backgrounds include elite American universities, research labs and high levels of government -- said in interviews that Russia's concerns are justified.

"The claim by the Missile Defense Agency is not correct," says Theodore Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a longtime missile defense critic. "And it is hard to understand how they could get something so basic wrong."

The agency's claims were made as part of an intensive U.S. diplomatic push early this year. Senior U.S. officials, including President George W. Bush, traveled to Europe to convince allies that Russian worries about U.S. missile capabilities were unfounded.

The trips followed threats by Russia to retarget its missiles at Europe. Some European officials had expressed skepticism about the plans and recommended further consultations with Russia. Public opinion in some countries, including Poland and the Czech Republic, ran against the U.S. plans.

To reassure the foreign governments and the public, Lt. Gen. Henry "Trey" Obering III, director of the Missile Defense Agency, presented slideshows intended to demonstrate that the Europe-based system was designed to counteract missiles only from Iran. The allies have not challenged the MDA's claims.

The physicists have told The Associated Press that Obering's presentations were misleading and inconsistent on key points. Postol, a former scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations, and George Lewis, associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University, have written a study of the MDA claims. Postol presented their findings Thursday in Washington.

"If the United States does not provide the allies with accurate information about the decisions they are being asked to participate in and that have direct relevance for their national security as well as ours, the credibility of the United States will continue to diminish," he said in his presentation.

Congressional testimony by Postol in 1992 helped rebut government claims of a high success rate in shooting down Iraqi scud missiles with Patriot missiles in the Persian Gulf War.

Pavel Podvig, a researcher at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, made his own estimates and confirmed Postol and Lewis' findings. Podvig, a Russian physicist, has been critical of both U.S. and Russian missile defense claims.

Three other physicists also reviewed Postol's findings and told The Associated Press that they found them accurate:

--Richard Garwin, a National Science Award winner, who is credited with the design of the first hydrogen bomb. Garwin served on the Rumsfeld Commission, an independent panel appointed by Congress in the 1990s to assess the threat to the United States from ballistic missiles.

--Philip Coyle, a former associate director of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Coyle was assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration in charge of testing weapons systems.

--David Wright, a physicist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear nonproliferation and environmental advocacy group.

The MDA has stood by their claims that the interceptors could not catch Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs.

"The basic fact of the matter is that we would never make a statement like that unless we knew it was true," said MDA spokesman Rick Lehner.

In one of Obering's slide presentations, labeled "Missile Defense for U.S. allies and Friends," an image illustrates the trajectory of a Russian ICBM from a point east of Moscow toward Washington. The slide, which also illustrates the Polish interceptors, says in bold script "Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles."

"The reason we selected Poland and the Czech Republic for the potential positions of these assets is because it was optimum for the Iranian threat," Obering said after a meeting with German officials in Berlin on March 15. "They are not positioned to where we can even catch the Russian missiles with these interceptors."

The dissenting scientists say that both those claims are incorrect: the interceptors could catch Russian ICBMs; the interceptors and the radar would be better positioned closer to Iran to counter a threat from its missiles.

Postol concluded that the MDA significantly understated the speed that their interceptors can reach when their boosters burn out and overstated how long they would need to track a missile by launching the interceptors.

While all six scientists are skeptical that the U.S. missile defense system can work, they believe that in terms of raw speed, U.S. interceptors in Poland could catch a Russian ICBM launched from western Russia at any part of the continental United States. In Postol's model, the intercept would occur at a point over the North Pole.

The Missile Defense Agency says that the Polish rockets would reach a burnout speed of 6.3 kilometers (3.9 miles) per second, roughly the speed of the Russian missiles depicted in Obering's slides. At that speed, the interceptors could not catch the Russian missiles.

But Postol says the interceptors could top 9 kilometers (5.6 miles) per second.

Responding to Postol's criticism, the MDA said Postol made assumptions about the interceptors that are based on theory, but in the real world they do not work as well. Not only are the interceptors one-third slower, their rocket motors' thrust is not as efficient when tested, and to get to Russian missiles they would be going through various stresses that exceed what would be considered normal design.

The MDA presented a chart of rocket motor efficiency from tests and noted that Postol's estimates did not reflect what happens in the real world.

But Garwin countered that at least one rocket motor was more efficient than a Postol estimate.

On Thursday, MDA posted a statement on its Web site.

"MDA stands by its figures, which are real, not hypothetical, and are derived from actual hardware and software performance data from actual flight tests," the statement said. The statement also charged that Postol was overly opitimistic about the interceptor capabilities.

Obering claimed in slides that the European system would expand protection from a U.S.-based system to parts of East Asia. Postol said that could not be true if the European interceptors were moving as slowly as the MDA is claiming.

The scientists have not disputed another argument used by U.S. officials that the 10 interceptors planned for Poland would be easily overwhelmed by Russia's vast arsenal, leading one supporter of missile defense to conclude that even if the scientists are correct, the U.S. argument holds up.

"I don't think it changes the basic assertion of the administration that this does not pose a threat to Russia," said Baker Spring, a national security analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.

However, Russia has expressed worries that once the bases are established, they could be expanded with more interceptors and improved capabilities.

One of Ted's main points (and I agree with him on that completely) is that whatever the politics of the issue, decisions should be based on accurate information. In this case, as he shows, the Missile Defense Agency claim that interceptors in Poland cannot reach Russian missiles is simply wrong. It is debatable whether this would make any difference, but this kind of misleading statements made by MDA certainly do not help the political situation.

[UPDATE 09/07/07: Russian-language version of the slides is available as well (PDF file, 8.4 Mb)]