GENEVA, 14 September -- The Conference on Disarmament this morning heard statements from China and the United States on the proposed US National Missile Defense System and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty .

The representative of China warned that there would be grave consequences if a United States National Missile Defense System was developed and deployed. It would undermine the global strategic balance and stability and threaten international peace and security. It was an absolutely urgent task for the international community to take effective measures to halt such a negative development. It was obvious that once the ABM Treaty was discarded and the door for the National Missile Defense System was opened, advanced weapon systems would be brought into outer space, leading to its weaponization. Referring to the stalemate in the work of the Conference on the programme of work, the representative said that what China was asking for was that when a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) was negotiated, the negotiations on a treaty preventing the weaponization of -- and an arms race in -- outer space should start as well.

In response, the representative of the United Sates said the statement made by China had to be addressed promptly. The amendments to the ABM Treaty that the United States was proposing would bring the Treaty up to date and would enable it to continue fulfilling its essential purpose. The United States agreed that it was appropriate for the Conference on Disarmament to keep the agenda item on prevention of an arms race in outer space under review. But it also pointed out that there was no arms race in outer space. Plans of the United States for a possible National Missile Defense System did not involve placing any weapon in outer space. Many successive Conference Presidents had reached the conclusion that an FMCT treaty was ripe for negotiation in the Conference, whereas nuclear disarmament and outer space were not. It was the unwise and unrealistic insistence on immediate negotiations on a new outer space treaty that kept the Conference from establishing an appropriate subordinate body to discuss nuclear disarmament.

Also today, the representative of Italy made a farewell speech. He said an FMCT treaty was the priority of Italy. Its negotiating mandate was clear. Italy did not set preconditions on it, and did not expect such conditions to be set by others. Italy was also ready to start work on other issues as soon as there was consensus on them and a negotiating mandate was reached.

Following the plenary, the Conference held an informal plenary to discuss its draft annual report to the General Assembly.

The next and final plenary of the Conference on Disarmament's 2000 session will be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday 21 September.

Statements

GIUSEPPE BALBONI ACQUA (Italy) said he was taking the floor today to say farewell because he was leaving tomorrow. He would not have imagined three years ago that he would miss the Palais des Nations and the Council Chamber. He would miss the "exclusive club" atmosphere of the Conference which was a genuine school of diplomacy.

When he first arrived in Geneva in 1997, the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini had addressed the Conference, defending its role as the sole multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament issues. Two years later, the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Patrizia Toia, had stressed that the universibility of the nuclear disarmament process had traditionally been pursued by Italy with the goal to eliminate such weapons. The Italian position, expressed clearly in recent years by senior representatives of the Government, did not need to be analyzed again because it was specific and well known. A fissile material cut-off treaty was ItalyÕs priority. Its negotiating mandate was clear. Italy did not set preconditions on it, and did not expect such conditions to be set by others. Italy was also ready to start work on other issues as soon as there was consensus on them and a negotiating mandate was reached. Italy knew that realism would prevail when there was a political will to resolve the problems.

HU XIAODI (China) said he would like to speak on the negative impacts of the National Missile Defense System and the relationship between it and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In recent years, there had been a negative development in the form of tremendous efforts to develop and deploy the National Missile Defense System, with a view to seeking unilateral military and strategic superiority. Subsequently, the ABM Treaty was in danger of collapsing. The international community was seriously concerned about that negative development as it would result in a series of grave consequences.

On 18 July 2000, the Presidents of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation had issued a joint statement in which they warned that to undermine the ABM Treaty would trigger off another round of the arms race and subsequently reverse the positive trend that had emerged in world politics after the end of the cold war. The two leaders had also stressed that the plan to establish a US National Missile Defense System, prohibited by the ABM Treaty, was a cause of profound concern. Implementation of the plan would have the gravest consequences for the security not only of China, Russia and other States, but also for that of the United States itself and for global strategic stability.

There would be grave consequences if a National Missile Defense System was developed and deployed. It would seriously obstruct arms control and disarmament processes and might lead to a new arms race. And it would disrupt international efforts at non-proliferation. It was an absolutely urgent task for the international community to take effective measures to halt such a negative development.

It was true that there were international treaties concluded in the past on the prevention of the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. However, China believed that it was of absolute necessity now to negotiate new international legal instruments to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. That position enjoyed extensive support from the international community. It had been claimed that the National Missile Defense System was not an outer space weapon and would not lead to an arms race in outer space. But, whether they were so-called "limited" or "more advanced", those systems undoubtedly included space weapon systems. It was obvious that once the ABM Treaty was discarded and the door for the National Missile Defense System was opened, advanced weapon systems would be brought into outer space, leading to its weaponization.

It had been charged that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were blocked because they were held "hostage" to negotiations on prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that they must be decoupled. But China had never said no to the negotiations on an FMCT treaty. What it was asking for was that when the FMCT treaty was negotiated, the negotiations on a treaty preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space should start as well. The Conference on Disarmament items were inter-related, and therefore the issues of outer space and an FMCT treaty could not but be closely linked. The recent announcement by the United States President not to deploy the National Missile Defense System for the time being did not mean that the plan had been given up; it was only a deferral of the decision to deploy it because its technology was not ripe yet and because it faced strong opposition from the international community. The United States President had instructed the continued development and testing of the system. It was therefore an urgent task for the Conference on Disarmament and the international community to negotiate legal instruments preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and to safeguard the ABM Treaty from being scrapped or weakened.

ROBERT GREY (United States) said the statement just made by China had to be addressed promptly. The ABM Treaty was concluded in 1972 between the United States and the USSR in a very different era and under political and military circumstances that were now a matter of history. The Treaty had been amended before and could be amended again. The amendments that the United States was proposing would bring the Treaty up to date and would enable it to continue fulfilling its essential purpose: making sure that the strategic nuclear deterrent forces of the United States and of the Russian Federation were not threatened by the missile defence capabilities of the other country. As a political and diplomatic reality from 1972, the ABM Treaty did not contemplate the new threats that were emerging now and that threatened the safety of the people of the United States. If the ABM Treaty were to fail now, the responsibility would rest with those who insisted that it remain static and could not be adapted to meet current realities.

Ambassador Grey said that when he addressed the Conference on 31 August, he had stated that the limited National Missile Defense System which the United States Government was considering would defend the people of the United States against a small-scale ballistic missile attack from certain countries of concern. That system was not designed to defend again the ballistic missiles of Russia or China. He was puzzled by the intensity of the concerns expressed. The United States rejected allegations that its plans attested to its desire for hegemony. These assertions had no basis in reality.

The United States agreed that it was appropriate for the Conference on Disarmament to keep the agenda item on prevention of an arms race in outer space under review. But it had also pointed out that there was no arms race in outer space, nor any prospect for that. Plans of the United States for a possible System of National Missile Defense did not involve placing any weapons in outer space.

The plain and simple fact was that all members of the Conference had committed themselves to supporting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Many successive Conference Presidents had reached the conclusion that a fissile material cut-off treaty was ripe for negotiation in the Conference, whereas nuclear disarmament and outer space were not. It was members of the Conference who attached very great importance to the establishment of a subordinate body on nuclear disarmament to discuss the subject in a structured and systematic way. But it was the unwise and unrealistic insistence on immediate negotiations on a new outer space treaty that kept the Conference from establishing an appropriate subordinate body to discuss nuclear disarmament. That unwise and unrealistic insistence on immediate negotiations on a new outer space treaty also prevented the Conference from conducting organized and sustained discussions on outer-space issues. The delegations employing those tactics might actually be intending to produce a paralysis for the sake of blocking negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

Ambassador Grey said he understood that this was a stark and rather unpleasant analysis. But the analysis was neither more stark nor more unpleasant than the excruciating and extended paralysis that still affected the Conference.