Plans announced last night by the Energy Secretary, John Battle, to ship weapons usable Mixed Oxide (MOX) nuclear material from Sellafield to Japan, are ill-conceived, environmentally dangerous and will further destabilise relations in East Asia, warned Greenpeace, today (19th January 1999).

Greenpeace believes that Battle's proposal to "prevent the proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials" by equipping the two Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd ships with "armaments for defensive use only, under the control of specially trained officers of the UK Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary" is woefully inadequate and could in no way guarantee the safety of this weapons usable material.

"Clearly the UK, French and Japanese Governments are placing the so-called commercial interest of the international plutonium industry before those of international security and environmental safety," said Pete Roche of Greenpeace.

If the UK Government really believes that this shipment is safe, it will immediately release details of any environmental impact assessment. In addition, it will also release its analysis of the effect of promoting the stockpiling of MOX in Japan on the country's neighbours, such as North Korea.

Under the terms of the nuclear co-operation agreement between the U.S. and Japan, a transportation plan for any shipment containing plutonium extracted from nuclear fuel originally supplied by the U.S. for use in Japan's power reactors is subject to U.S. approval.

In 1992, the United States required Japan to use a gunboat to escort a shipment of plutonium from France to Japan, in a ship called the Akatsuki-Maru. Japan is pressing the U.S. not to require an armed-escort vessel for this shipment by arguing that the same stringent physical protection standards need not apply, because the plutonium has been converted into MOX fuel. But high-ranking U.S. Officials have confirmed that these physical protection requirements apply to both MOX fuel and plutonium and that any "alternative security measures" are unlikely to be acceptable for the entire voyage.

Plutonium is a key ingredient of nuclear weapons. There is ample evidence that reactor-grade plutonium can be used to fabricate nuclear weapons. Less than eight kilograms is enough to construct a bomb. The plutonium in fresh MOX fuel can be separated from the uranium by straightforward chemical means.

"This transport undermines the international negotiations about to get underway in the United Nations, geared towards ending the production and use of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons," warned Roche. "The UK, France, Japan and the U.S. should move immediately to end the proposed trade in plutonium under the guise of MOX and instead concentrate their efforts on ensuring that the UN talks are a success in the interest of both current and future generations. Any country with a supply of MOX, has a short cut to the bomb," said Roche.

Notes:
The transport ships are also expected to collect MOX fuel from the French reprocessing plant at La Hague.

The MOX fuel in this particular shipment will be produced at Sellafield in the small Demonstration MOX Plant. The larger Sellafield MOX Plant is still awaiting Government approval before it can start operation. It is thought that this larger plant has yet to secure any contracts for MOX fuel fabrication from Japanese utilities, although, of course this kind of information is commercially confidential.

The Environment Agency, in its "Proposed Decision on the Justification for the Plutonium Commissioning and Full Operation of the [Sellafield] Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant" released in October 1998 said: "Separated plutonium is generally described as weapons grade or civil grade. For most practical purposes the grade does not affect the arguments concerning weapons proliferation" and "It would be a relatively straightforward matter to undertake chemical separation of plutonium from MOX fuel. It is debatable how easy it would then be to assemble the plutonium into a crude nuclear device actually capable of exploding [but] a terrorist group would arguably be able to exercise considerable power by merely threatening to explode such a weapon."

US State Department officials - Under-secretary of State John Whitehead in 1988 and then Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in 1996 - have confirmed that the physical protection requirements apply to both MOX fuel and plutonium. They also confirmed that any "alternative security measures" are unlikely to be acceptable for the entire voyage.

For further information contact the Greenpeace press office on 0171 865 8255/6/7/8

Here is an answer given by the UK's Energy Minister to a question asked in Parliament yesterday (18th January 1999).

Nuclear Fuel

Mr. Drew: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what arrangements are being made to return to Japan nuclear materials recovered from reprocessing Japanese spent nuclear fuel at BNFL's Sellafield plant. [66647]

Mr. Battle: The Government have been consulting the Government of Japan for some time about arrangements for returning the nuclear materials, including plutonium, recovered from reprocessing Japanese spent nuclear fuel at Sellafield. This is in keeping with the terms of the letters exchanged between the two Governments in 1978 in support of reprocessing contracts between Japanese utilities and BNFL and the policy of successive Governments.

The Government of Japan's preferred means of using the recovered plutonium is for it to be converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for use in Japanese nuclear power stations. The MOX fuel, including material produced by BNFL's counterpart COGEMA in France, will be returned by sea and carried by UK-flagged transport ships belonging to Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd. (PNTL), a subsidiary of BNFL.

18 Jan 1999 : Column: 365

The purpose of the consultations between the UK and Japan has been to ensure that appropriate measures are put in place for the physical protection of the material in line with internationally agreed commitments and recommendations on physical protection and reflecting the concern of all parties to prevent the proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials. This includes compliance with the recommendation of the International Atomic Energy Agency that MOX fuel, like all other Category 1 nuclear material, should be accompanied during transport by an armed security escort.

All plutonium recovered from Japanese spent fuel reprocessed in Europe originates from uranium which was enriched in the US. Because of this, it falls within US rules of origin under which the US retains certain rights and responsibilities over its retransfer. This means that plans for the transport of MOX fuel from Europe to Japan by sea must comply with specific US requirements concerning safety and physical protection. These are set out in the 1988 US-Japan agreement on nuclear co-operation and include the requirement either that the transport ship should be accompanied by an armed escort vessel or that alternative security measures acceptable to the US should be in place.

The security arrangements currently under discussion with Japan and the US would involved 2 PNTL transport ships travelling together for mutual protection. Each would carry armaments, for defensive use only, under the control of specially trained officers of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary. These security provisions are solely for protecting the ships, their crew and their cargo in the extremely unlikely eventuality of an armed assault by terrorists.

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