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THE MENWITH HILL SITE |
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MENWITH HILL - SIGINT and War Fighting |
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Major General Judd Blaisdell, director of space operations and integration at the Pentagon has described how the US Air Force is using space to enhance its
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities: “During Operation Iraqi Freedom, various ISR assets provided information to the combined air operations centers, allowing them to make rapid battlefield decisions, putting coalition forces inside the enemy's decision cycle.” [ 100 ] The US military has described space-based intelligence collection as a “key force-multiplier for future military operations”. The close linkage between space-based intelligence collection and military operations was clearly spelt out in congressional testimony a few years ago by the then Director of the National Reconnaissance Office: "In the future, US forces will rely upon space systems for global awareness of threats, swift orchestration of military operations, and precision use of smart weapons. ... Our goal is to detect, track and target anything of significance worldwide and to get the right information to the right people at the right time." The objective is to enable the US military to deliver "precise military firepower anywhere in the world, day or night, in all weather". Intelligence collection is the foundation for war planning. Together with high-resolution satellite imagery, signals intelligence played a vital role in identifying military targets in Iraq. Signals intelligence was used to identify key Iraqi military command, control, communications and intelligence facilities that became priority targets for the US offensive. Australian personnel at Pine Gap and UK personnel at Menwith Hill were intimately involved in these processes. SIGINT and The Gulf War [ 101 ] The importance of the monitoring and collection of SIGINT during times of ‘international tension’ is obvious and Menwith Hill station received an award for its support to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1988. In 1991, a further award was given for support of the Iraqi war operations, Desert Storm and Desert Shield. [ 102 ] SIGINT provided one of the first indicators of Iraqi intentions in Kuwait: "A Soviet-built TALL KING radar that abruptly resumed operation Sunday morning, July 29, in souther Iraq gave US analysts their first substantive warning that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was likely." The 350 mile range radar had been out of service for a number of months prior to the invasion. [ 103 ] An intensive signals intelligence campaign mounted in the later part of August 1990 was expected to provide 12 to 24 hours advance notice of an Iraqi attack. In October it was reported that: "US electronic listening posts - including AWACS, intelligence ships, and ground stations - have been somewhat successful in monitoring Iraqi military communications. But much of the Iraqi army has been using underground cables to communicate between Baghdad and Kuwait. The secure communications have made it difficult to determine Iraqi military intentions... the Iraqis took steps to secure their communications several years ago after a US newspaper disclosed details of a US electronic eavesdropping operation against Iraq." [ 104 ] Later in October: "electronic intelligence operations in the region detected the first characteristic signs of Hawk radar operation at a special test site for air defense equipment near Baghdad. The radar emanations indicated that Iraq is 'playing around' with the weapons systems, as one official put it, but still remains weeks to months away from actually deploying them." [ 105 ] And: "US intelligence collected in November (revealed) that a Soviet military officer was overheard giving orders on an Iraqi military radio channel in Kuwait. The US intercept, picked up in southern Kuwait, sounded like a Soviet officer directing an Iraqi tank battalion... The information was collected by the US National Security Agency and reported secretly within the US government. A subsequent intelligence report said Britain's electronic intelligence agency disputed the veracity of the intercepted communication and said the report was 'under further analysis'." [ 106 ] Signals intelligence systems also provided warning of impending Iraqi Scud missile launches. The missile launchers: "Saddam has changed his daily routine and movements as a result of disclosures that US air forces had targeted him, his family, his mistress and members of his family." [ 112 ] SIGINT was instrumental in the identification of the Amiriya bomb shelter in Baghdad which was alleged to have sent signals from the shelter to a remote antenna via cable in order to avoid disclosing the location. [ 113 ] Despite there being limited photographic coverage, apparently "intercepts of military communications from the shelter were monitored" close to the actual bombing which killed hundreds of civilians on 12 February 1991. However, a "Pentagon official, who asked not to be named, suggested that the installation was not broadcasting its messages by antenna. Rather, this official implied, that the center used buried communications lines to transmit its messages, which were later relayed to forces in the field." [ 114 ] Following the controversy that surrounded the bombing, "some political leaders pushed to release intercepted radio signals from the site," [ 115 ] but this never happened. American scepticism concerning Iraq's offer on15 February to withdraw from Kuwait, subject to a number of conditions, was reinforced by signals intelligence. "...
radio intercepts overheard no orders going out from Baghdad telling Iraqi commanders the war is nearing an end...” [
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- Alice Mahon MP.
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