WOMENWITH HILL WOMEN’S PEACE CAMP(AIGN)
C/o 8 Somerville Terrace, East Busk Lane, Otley, West Yorkshire, UK  Flossiemintballs@aol.com

Submission for the attention of
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

[Further details and supporting evidence for all statements made in this submission are available on application to Anne Lee, only if required for the purposes of the public consultation relating to US Missile Defense Agency’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement]

Introduction

WoMenwith Hill Women’s Peace Camp(aign) is a non-violent direct action campaign focused in opposition to Menwith Hill Station and in addition calling for the closure of US Bases in Britain and around the world. We are also affiliated to the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, the Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Menwith Hill Forum (a locally-based group set up to examine issues of public concern resulting from the presence of the US Bases at Menwith Hill and Fylingdales).

The WoMenwith Hill Women’s Peace Campaign is aware of, and supports all objections to, the degradation of the earth and space environments, which are and would result from implementation of the United States’ Missile Defence programme. It is with this overall detrimental impact in mind that we submit our representation, specific to the programme’s environmental impact at the ground stations and more specifically at Royal Air Force Menwith Hill and Royal Air Force Fylingdales Stations in the British Isles.

Crucial to the US Missile Defence programme is the stationing of ‘forward surveillance’ facilities located outside the continental USA at US Bases on land it is permitted to use by host nations. The political structure of such nations may be very different from the Federal Government (e.g. Britain is a Monarchy: q.v. ‘Crown Defence Land’). The legislation regulating environmental controls in other countries may be very different, possibly more stringent, than that which obtains within the USA. It is incumbent on the Missile Defense Agency to apprise itself of, and publish an undertaking to comply with, mandatory statutory requirements wherever on the Earth it proposes to site Missile Defence facilities.

We submit that the following observations, although relating mainly to our personal experiences of the position at the US Bases at RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales, both in North Yorkshire, England, have wider relevance. The Missile Defense Agency’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement must acknowledge and include Environmental Impact Assessments for each and every US Missile Defence Base proposed to be sited on land in nations with British or British Commonwealth status, and also in other independent sovereign nations (e.g. Denmark’s sovereignty over Thule).

The global ground stations operate as:

Global Surveillance Network

The long-established US satellite-surveillance downlink and relay Bases, such as Menwith Hill and Pine Gap, positioned around the world for the purpose of intelligence gathering, are necessary components of the US Missile Defense System, as they would be used to monitor in advance, the preparations for the launch of a rocket. These facilities comprise part of the US Missile Defence system package and exclusion from the US Missile Defence Agency’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement deliberations cannot be justified.

Britain and the British Commonwealth conveniently provide the USA with land for its surveillance stations around the world. Because of the ‘special relationship’ binding Britain, the USA considers that ground stations located on British or British Commonwealth soil to be particularly secure. Thus the USA has surveillance facilities located in the British Isles, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ascension Island and Diego Garcia or co-located with British surveillance facilities (e.g. Cyprus).

The British Government has been compliant in acceding to the wishes and interests of the USA, even going so far as to evict the population of the Chagos Islands to permit the construction of the US Base on the island of Diego Garcia.

US Missile Defence at Bases in Britain: Recent History

Specific to the US Bases in England, the British Government has already granted permission for the USA to upgrade the Early Warning Radar at Fylingdales and agreed that, if necessary it may be used for US Missile Defense. Further formal requests for the Missile Defense use of Menwith Hill, as a satellite downlink and relay for infrared tracking systems; construction of an X-Band Radar, and the stationing of the interceptor missiles in Britain, are anticipated.

RAF Fylingdales

The formal request for the use of RAF Fylingdales for US Missile Defence purposes was announced by the Rt Hon Geoff Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on 15 December 2002. His decision to grant permission was deferred to allow a public consultation exercise to be carried out. This was curtailed by the imposition of a deadline of 15 January 2003 (the Christmas Recess of Parliament intervened) for representations to be submitted to the House of Commons Defence Committee and 31 January 2003 for the public announcement of his decision.

In January 2003, we contributed submissions to the deliberations of the House of Commons Defence Committee. The public consultation period was a totally inadequate farce of democratic procedure. The Committee was extremely worried that the Secretary of State for Defence had rushed through the procedure with unseemly haste and even publicly announced his decision prior to issuance of the Committee’s conclusions.

On 29 January 2003, the House of Commons Defence Committee published its conclusions. (MISSILE DEFENCE Report of Session 2002 – 03, HC 290 – 1). It contained a strongly worded criticism accusing the Secretary of State for Defence of stifling the debate:

- ‘Despite the Secretary of State’s unequivocal statement that he wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively curtailed such discussions…

- ‘…we deplore the manner in which the public debate on the issue of the upgrade has been handled by the Ministry of Defence. It has shown no respect for either the views of those affected locally by the decision or for the arguments of those opposed to the upgrade in principle.’

The Committee demanded further information about the nature of the Early Warning Radar upgrade, its operations and the impact on the environment. They stated that:

Nevertheless the House of Commons Defence Committee did conclude that it was permissible to allow this limited upgrade Fylingdales Early Warning Radar and its use ‘in missile defence mode’ for US Missile Defense purposes.

Their conclusion is wrong.

The installation and operation of components of the USA’s Missile Defense System on Britain’s Crown Defence Land is unlawful and would require a new Act of Parliament.

The Defence Committee’s demand for further information was acknowledged on 16 June 2003 by the UK Ministry of Defence’s publication of a Report: ‘Upgrade to RAF Fylingdales Early Warning Radar – Environment and Land Use Report’. This may be found at http://www.mod.uk/publications/raf_fylingdales_upgrade/

The MoD’s Report did not address the Committee’s concerns

The MoD’s Report is also inaccurate in several identifiable areas.

The MoD’s Report is not an impartial assessment conducted by an independent inspector. Its purpose is a propaganda exercise, to reassure Parliament, the public and especially the North York Moors National Park Authority, the local Council responsible for the upkeep of the National Park, which includes the Fylingdales area. The MoD’s Report asserts that no Planning Application for the radar upgrade would be necessary, because the environmental impact would be de minimus.

A Planning Application, which would necessitate consultation with the Council’s Planning Committee, would have allowed the public the opportunity to make comments and objections at a public Council Meeting reported by the media. Objectors to the development were thus denied the opportunity of a platform to state their arguments and make demands for an impartial Environmental Impact Assessment, Archaeological Survey and Public Inquiry.

A ‘Response’, to the MoD’s Report, submitted on behalf of WoMenwith Hill Women’s Peace Camp(aign), was delivered to the North York Moors National Park Authority, in advance of its full Council Meeting on 29 September 2003. At this meeting the decision relating to the requirement for a Planning Application for the Fylingdales’ upgrade was to be determined.

Six days in advance of the supposed democratic, decision-making meeting, the media published a statement from the Council that no Planning Application was required. The Chief Planning Officer’s decision was based on the assurance in the MoD’s Report that, because there would be no alteration to the physical appearance of the site and no increase in Radio Frequency power radiating from the pyramid, there could be no grounds requiring submission of a Planning Application.

‘Change of use’ of premises (e.g. a shop to offices) normally requires a Planning Application and would have justified such for the Fylingdales upgrade.

The WoMenwith ‘Response’ was circulated to the UK Ministry of Defence Estates’ Organisation in September 2003. To date no reply has been received. We believe this may be because the Ministry of Defence is avoiding addressing the assertion that their Fylingdales’ Upgrade Report contains inaccuracies.

The Defence Secretary’s decision, in December 2002, to defer consideration of the associated X-Band Radar (which would be a major construction and would require a Planning Application and probably Public Inquiry) may be a reaction to the strength of public opinion. In 2002, the media reported widespread public concern about the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the implications of Britain’s involvement with ‘Star Wars’ and fears that the upgrade of Fylingdales represented the ‘thin end of the wedge’. Many people suspect that by deferring consideration of X-band Radar plans to a future date, the Secretary of State for Defence was deploying a tactic to try to defuse objections by introducing the US Missile Defence programme’s components in piecemeal instalments.

Although the Fylingdales’ radar upgrade was stated not to justify a Planning Application, this would not be true of either X-Band Radar installations or missile interceptor launch sites. Proposals to construct such would generate mass opposition. There would be objections from the peace movement and environmentalists internationally in addition to local concern for the consequential environmental degradation to the locality. US Missile Defence developments would be challenged through Parliament and the normal channels for presentation of arguments at Public Inquiries.

Some of the opposition to further developments would involve an escalation of non-violent direct action, similar to that at Greenham Common in the 1980’s.

On 13 April 2004, BBC TV carried the news that work had started on the Fylingdales ‘revamp’.

On 17 October 2004, the media carried the ‘leak’ that a secret, top-level agreement had been reached to permit siting of missile interceptors in Britain.

On 14 November, The Observer published a letter from the Secretary of State for Defence denying that missile interceptors would be placed at Fylingdales or that any secret discussions had taken place.

Menwith Hill

It is not generally acknowledged that the whole of Menwith Hill’s Operations plays a role in US Missile Defense.

The long-established signals’ intelligence systems have the capability to detect the advance preparations prior to a missile launch, and convey that information via the US National Security Agency’s Defense Special Missile and Aeronautics Center at Fort Meade.

Two radomes and operations buildings for a space-based infrared tracking system have already been installed and the Station’s organisation restructured, in advance of any permission for its use for US Missile Defense. The satellite infrared capability can track ICBMs at and after launch.

During the past two years or more there has been a steady stream of Planning Applications to the Harrogate Borough Council for infrastructure expansion at Menwith Hill. Indications are that the Base operations are due to expand c. 50% (e.g. a recent Planning Application is for 50% increase in the electricity generated for use by the satellite downlink and computer operations).

As at Fylingdales, there are suspicions that dribbling through the Planning Applications may well be a deliberate policy to defuse objections. Gradual introduction of these plans means that each is considered individually and not in the overall context of the total package. Public opposition, therefore, has been virtually non-existent.

Because of regulations relating to developments on Crown Land (q.v. ’Crown Defence Land: Ownership, Occupation and Use’) prior to the introduction of new legislation in May, the Harrogate Borough Council had no statutory powers of enforcement should it have objected to any of these proposals for expansion at Menwith Hill. In practice the law has never been tested, because the Council almost unanimously supports the presence of the US Base. It is one of the biggest employers in the district and is said to benefit the local economy by $62M annually. A statutory Public Inquiry, which would provide a well-publicised platform for objections to be heard, can happen only by the Council’s application. It may thus appear to be unrealistic in the prevailing circumstances to expect that the Harrogate Borough Council would ever request it.

There have however been two recent changes in legislation governing developments considered to have significant environmental impact. These are the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, allowing the public to have greater participation in decisions impacting on the environment and the European Parliament’s removal of the Crown Land exemption from the Environmental Impact Assessment, which must accompany any substantial development proposals (q.v. ‘Crown Defence Land: Developments: Environmental Impact’).

An argued case calling for Environmental Impact Assessment, Archaeological Survey and a Public Inquiry was submitted by WoMenwith Hill Women’s Peace Camp(aign) to the Harrogate Borough Council’s Planning Department, and the Ministry of Defence Estates’ Organisation, in response to a recent Planning Application to enclose the whole of Menwith Hill, including the areas of pasture, inside a razor-wire topped security fence bristling with CCTV cameras.

The case was submitted in January 2004, prior to the changes in the relevant legislation in May.

On 26 February, under the ‘delegated legislation’ arrangements, a non-elected Civil Servant (a Planning Officer) approved the plans.

Neither these plans, nor any others in the past two years, have been put on the Agenda for deliberation by the elected members of the Council’s Planning Committee Meeting.

Crown Defence Land: Ownership, Occupation and Use: the Law Ownership of Crown Land

Defence Land is designated ‘Crown Land’. The three categories of Crown Land are:

The size of the Crown Defence Estate in the UK is 240,000 hectares (593, 052 acres). This includes considerable areas in North Yorkshire, England, most of which was appropriated during World War 11 and is surplus to any current requirement for military purposes.

Menwith Hill Station and Fylingdales Station are both located on Crown Defence Land in North Yorkshire.

Acquisition and Use of Land by the Secretary of State for Defence: the Law

The appropriation and management of land for the purposes of the defence interests of the British Isles is regulated by the Defence Act 1842 and the Military Lands Acts 1892 to 1903 plus subsequent amendments (e.g. to incorporate the Royal Air Force).

Defence Act 1842

Title: ‘Acquisition and Use of Land’

‘Citation: to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Services of the Ordnance Department, and the vesting and Purchase of Lands and Hereditaments for those Services, and for the Defence and Security of the Realm’.

The 1842 Act, therefore, states specifically the purpose for which land in Britain may be appropriated and its use for ‘the defence and Security of the Realm’.The Defence Act 1842 is the legislation passed by Queen Victoria, which established ‘Her Majesty’s Surveyors of Ordnance’. The Ordnance Survey, instituted for military purposes, eventually became the UK statutory civilian authority for mapmaking. Unless Parliament were to pass new legislation re-establishing Her Majesty’s Ordnance Survey Department, the 1842 Act cannot be repealed.

The 1842 Act empowers the Secretary of State for War (now Defence) to purchase land either by agreement with the landowner or by compulsory purchase. The Act permits surveyors to enter onto privately owned land in order to survey it for the possibility of acquiring it for military purposes.

The Military Lands Act 1892 ‘PART 1 Powers to purchase land. – (1) A Secretary of State may purchase land in the United Kingdom under this Act, for the military purposes of any portion of Her Majesty’s military forces’.

The 1892 Act is an attempt to form a single body of legislation incorporating and/or repealing the previous different Acts passed throughout Queen Victoria’s reign.

The 1892 Act defines the extent of, but also the limitations on, the Secretary of State’s management of Crown Defence Lands: ‘…for the military purposes of any portion of Her Majesty’s military forces’.

Occupation of Crown Defence Land by a Foreign Power: the Law

The occupation of Crown Defence Lands by the visiting forces of a foreign sovereign power is governed by the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA), which was signed in London on 19 June 1951, later ratified by the UK Parliament as the Visiting Forces Act, 1952.

Article 1X (s.3) of the Visiting Forces Act states:

‘…the authorities of the receiving State shall assume sole responsibility for making suitable arrangements to make available to a force or civilian component the buildings and grounds which it requires…’

The 1951 NATO SOFA was agreed

‘…appropriate to the relationship which exists between the United Kingdom and the United States for the purpose of our common defence’ (Jeremy Hanley, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, in reply to the late Bob Cryer MP, 25 March 1994. Hansard)

The stipulation ‘arrangements for common defence’ is stated by the NATO SOFA, the Visiting Forces Act and repeated in the updated International Headquarters and Defence Organisations Act 1964.

In 1999 the legislation was amended by Order in Council to take account of recent changes in legislation (e.g. the Town and Country Planning Act 1990). The amendment to the existing legislation is the Visiting Forces and International Headquarters (Application of Law) Order 1999 (Statutory Instrument 1736).

Significantly, in light of the USA’s request for its unilateral use of lands allocated for NATO purposes, the 1999 Statutory Instrument omits to repeat ‘arrangements for common defence’. Nevertheless, as the originating Acts have not been repealed, the condition stating ‘arrangements for common defence’ remains applicable.

The Law is specific, the Secretary of State is granted statutory powers to acquire and manage land for the purpose of the defence of the realm - and not for the purpose of the exclusive defence of a foreign power, whatever the relationship between Britain and that nation.

The Law does not empower the Secretary of State to grant the USA, or any other foreign power, military use of the Crown Defence Lands in his care, unless it is specifically used for the defence of the British Isles. Thus the Law would disallow the USA’s use of UK Defence Lands for the USA’s Missile Defence system, which is not designed to protect the British Isles from an attack by Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. US Missile Defence is exclusively for the protection of the continental USA.

The Law allows foreign power members of NATO to conduct military activities on Crown Defence Land in support of NATO. For example, to comply with the Law, the interception of communications by the US National Security Agency at Menwith Hill Station must be for military purposes only - and on behalf of NATO. The collection of intelligence exclusively for US national interests or any other purpose (e.g. political, diplomatic or commercial, such as the collection and distribution by the ECHELON global network) is an illegal misuse of Crown Defence Land.

This begs the question of whether the NATO SOFA ‘arrangement’ for the USA’s occupation and use of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales is legitimate and whether the Secretary of State for Defence knowingly colludes with the conduct of illegal activities (q.v. ‘Collusion: Environmental Impact’). The Law is clear - the entire function, not just part, of the operations at Menwith Hill Station and Fylingdales must be for British and NATO military activities conducted in defence of the UK.

The High Court of the Royal Courts of Justice has examined in what circumstances the US Bases’ authorities are exempt from compliance with the law and the jurisdiction of the Courts (Menwith Hill US Base Commander, Colonel G Dickson Gribble v Helen John, 31 July 1997).

The Office of Secretary of State, whether of Defence or of any other UK Government Ministry, does not confer on its holder a statutory authority to negotiate disposal of national assets, such as Crown Defence Land, to a foreign power.

It would appear that the Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP, has exceeded and abused the powers granted to his office.

We believe his action is in Law ultra vires and mala fides and therefore Treason.

Crown Defence Lands:

Developments: Environmental Impact

Since the Fylingdales and Menwith Hill submissions, there has been a significant step towards implementation of the Aarhus Convention, which gives the public greater participation in the decision-making process related to developments having impact on the environment.

In January 2004, the European Commission considered taking legal action against the UK over failure to comply with European Union’s legislation requiring that Environmental Impact Assessments be carried out prior to certain developments. The European Commission took the first step in the legal procedure, when it issued a final warning to the UK Government, stating that its legislation was inadequate to cover developments on land owned by the State (i.e. Crown Land).

Crown Land was excluded from statutory planning enforcement and exempt from the various UK regulations transposing the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (85/337/EEC as amended by 97/11/EC) into UK Law.

The UK Government maintained that administrative procedures already existed under the Town and Country Planning Act 1984 (Department of the Environment Circular 18/84) to ensure public consultation on Crown Land developments. However, the European Commission considered that legislative measures incorporating statutory powers were needed. The UK Government accepted this as necessary and the relevant legislation removing ‘Crown Immunity’, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act, received Royal Assent on 22 May 2004.

Possibly it is significant that the raft of measures for the expansion of Menwith Hill’s infrastructure was submitted in the two years prior to 22 May 2004.

Proposed developments on Crown Land are subject now to the normal statutory planning controls. This will include a statutory requirement to conduct Public Inquiry to consider evidence of the implications of major development proposals and to conduct a full Environmental Impact Assessment and Archaeological Survey.

It remains to be seen whether the UK Ministry of Defence will successfully argue that future developments relate to UK ‘national security’ and whether they can be exempted from Environmental Impact Assessment under the new legislation. Presumably the Secretary of State for Defence would have to justify such a position and produce evidence for exemption – and prove that US Missile Defense functions for the ‘national security’ of the British Isles.

The proposal to construct X-Band Radar or locate missile interceptors at launch sites in the British Isles would be classified as a development requiring statutory Public Inquiry conducted by an impartial Planning Inspector. This would be conducted similar to a Court of Law to hear evidence from all interested parties including members of the public. The UK Ministry of Defence would not be permitted to issue its own Environment Report, such as that for the Fylingdales’ Upgrade, arguing a one-sided case, to which the public made no contribution.

The conduct of non-statutory Public Inquiry, under the previous Circular 18/84 procedure, was carried out to examine the environmental impact consequent on the Ministry of Defence’s plans for developments at the Otterburn Ranges on Crown Defence Land in the Northumberland National Park. The Public Inquiries ran for five years. In October 2001, in consequence of 9/11, the Planning Inspectors’ recommendations were overridden. The UK Secretary of State for Defence ordered the developments to proceed. He then had the power to do this if it was perceived to be in the interests of the defence of the realm.

The recent changes in legislation under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act, 2004, remain to be tested.

US Bases on Crown Defence Land: Pollution of the Environment

The former Royal Air Force Base at Greenham Common serves as an example of the contamination resulting from its occupation by the US Airforce.

The information publicly available describing the restoration and regeneration of Greenham and Crookham Commons is published on the West Berkshire District Council website http://www.westberks.gov.uk. The website presents only a fraction of the overall pollution picture. In practice only the surface environment has had remedial treatment. The prohibitive cost of investigating the underground contamination means that the total detrimental impact will never be assessed.

It is not possible to assess a figure for the costs incurred in the limited restoration of the surface of the land. The West Berkshire Council’s figure of c. £1.5 million does not take account of the considerable unpaid work of volunteers.

The US Government has no statutory responsibility for, and makes no contribution towards, the cost of the clean up.

Fylingdales and Menwith Hill: Environmental Concerns

The following illustrative examples comprise only some of the environmental issues about which we have made representations to the relevant authorities in recent years. This list is by no means exhaustive.

There is widespread public concern about the detrimental environmental impact created by the Fylingdales’ radar pyramid.

The foremost concern is the possible harmful biological effects of the non-ionising radio frequency emissions from the radar.

For example, the local village of Goathland is a major tourist attraction because it is featured in the Heartbeat TV ‘soap opera’ and its antique steam railway. Goathland is in direct line-of-sight from the Fylingdales radar pyramid and is therefore a recipient of RF emissions from the ‘sidelobes’ of the radar.

Although the UK Ministry of Defence assures the local population that the radar is entirely safe, it sets off car alarms and disables ignition systems as far away as Goathland. The Base authorities publish a health and safety guide for employees and visitors warning of these effects and the possible danger of creating a spark by induction if attempting to fill a petrol tank using a metal container.

There is no adequate official scientific study of the biological effects on plant, animal and the human body resulting from Fylingdales’ radar emissions.

Professor Dave Webb, Chair of Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, has published a paper, ‘Is it Safe?’ which can be read at http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/fdales/.  Professor Webb maintains that the safety standards are inadequate and presents the evidence to substantiate his arguments. The reassuring conclusions published in the UK Ministry of Defence’s ‘Upgrade to RAF Fylingdales Early Warning Radar - Environment and Land Use Report’ are based on the inadequate safety guidelines. We endorse Prof. Webb’s position and submit that his paper be considered by the US Missile Defense Agency as a contribution to public responses to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement.

Both Fylingdales and Menwith Hill occupy elevated positions in rural areas of high-quality landscape – in areas economically heavily dependent on tourism. The incongruous ‘sci-fi’ structures, Menwith Hill’s 30 giant white ‘golf balls’ and Fylingdales huge truncated pyramid silhouetted against the sky, are visible for miles, especially from the surrounding hills.

Fylingdales is in the North York Moors National Park.

Menwith Hill overlooks Nidderdale. The boundary of the Nidderdale Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (eventually to be incorporated into the Yorkshire Dales National Park) was tightly drawn around Menwith Hill’s perimeter to exclude the Base on grounds that it is ugly.

The National Parks are areas of the British Isles, where a strictly enforced statutory conservation policy applies to preserve the rural amenity in perpetuity as a national heritage.

Only considerations of acute emergency national security would permit developments such as Menwith Hill and Fylingdales.

Both Fylingdales and Menwith Hill are sites of prehistoric importance known to date from the Neolithic period or earlier. Conservation of the archaeological heritage is a prime consideration in Britain and must be considered in the deliberations for the US Missile Defense Agency’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. The damage to these sites so far is incalculable. Herewith two examples:

Menwith Hill: The Base is located on Forest Moor, an area of significance to archaeologists for its Neolithic settlement, testified by the wealth of flint microliths.

The site is adjacent to an Iron-Age Brigantian Fort. The Roman Road joining the fort at Ilkley (Olicana) to the city of York (Eboracum) borders the southern boundary of the Base.

The US occupants in c.1990 removed an ancient megalith known as ‘Tibby Bilton’, possibly the last standing remnant of a prehistoric group or circle of standing stones.

Fylingdales (or more properly, Snod Hill):

The presence of a tumulus, a group of (fallen) megaliths and petroglyphs is evidence that Snod Hill is a prehistoric funerary site.

Snod Hill is crossed by prehistoric trackways, ancient rights of way dating from the Bronze Age or earlier, for over two thousand years in use as a ‘Salt Road’ from the coastal settlements. The Salt Road is notorious in later history as a route for smugglers.

The Salt Road was closed peremptorily and permanently to permit the construction of the Early Warning Radar facilities.

The location of Fylingdales Station gives rise to concern because of its proximity to Sites of Special Scientific Interest. Special conservation measures statutorily apply to such sites. In the case of Fylingdales it is because of endangered plant species and breeding sites for rare moorland birds. No construction work is permitted at Fylingdales during the birds’ breeding season – April to August inclusive.

Herewith two recent examples out of the many complaints made to the Bases’ authorities:

Fylingdales:

In January 2002 the unauthorised construction of a limestone internal perimeter patrol road, part of the security upgrade in advance of its US Missile Defence role, gave rise to fears that the effect would be to raise pH levels in the surrounding acid bogs. Construction work had to be halted to allow an Environmental Impact Assessment to be conducted. This was not an impartial assessment by an independent inspector, but a mitigation exercise carried out by the UK Ministry of Defence. In the event it was concluded that to remove the road and reconstruct it in a less alkaline material would cause greater damage than to permit it to remain.

Menwith Hill: The discovery of a colony of rare feral orchids, in natural wetland on the north-west of the Base, led to an investigation by Professor Bateman, Keeper of Botany at the Natural History Museum, the country’s top orchid expert. As a result of his research in 1999, the proposed high security fence was relocated to skirt the orchid site instead of cutting through it and the Menwith Hill authorities agreed to conserve the orchids’ site as a reserve. Further complaints are ongoing because of their failure to implement Prof. Bateman’s management recommendations.

The UK Environment Agency is the statutory body responsible for monitoring and maintaining the quality of the water environment including the public water supply. It has no access or authority to investigate the Crown Defence Land inside the Bases, but it does monitor the emergent water outflows, including the sewage and can authorise remedial action.

Herewith two examples of recent complaints:

Fylingdales: During the heavy flooding of 31 July 2002 the Fylingdales sewage works overflowed and raw sewage ran down the hillside and entered Eller Beck at Ellerbeck Bridge east of the Base. Eller beck flows through the village of Goathland. The Goathland Parish Council was informed and discussed the issue at its August Parish Council Meeting.

Menwith Hill: The site causes concern because of its position on the gathering ground for the city of Leeds water supply. The surface water run-off from the Base enters Swinsty Reservoir via Spinksburn Beck.

The Menwith Hill Forum made enquiries recently about the history of environmental contamination resulting from the presence of Menwith Hill. The Environment Agency responded to the request and from its enquiries it emerged that a major spill of diesel fuel (the Station generates its own electricity from diesel generators) had occurred in the mid-90’s, but that all the documentary evidence had been destroyed. The only surviving evidence is the memories of those personnel who were engaged on the remedial clean-up.

The fact that there was no public announcement at the time of this incident is one example that serves to indicate that it is not possible for statutory public authorities to assess the level of contamination created to the land and the water inside these Bases.

If such evidence cannot be presented to the Missile Defence Programme Environmental Impact Survey, how can it be taken into consideration?

Within the UK no official body with oversight responsibilities to monitor development abuses on the US Bases exists.

There have been a number of instances where we have brought abuses of planning process to the attention of the relevant local government authorities and the UK Ministry of Defence. These include for example:

Fylingdales:

The security fence (and unauthorised internal perimeter police patrol road) on the southwest side of the Base unlawfully encroached outside the boundary of the Base onto land held by the Forestry Commission.

The Under Secretary of State for Defence was obliged to remedy the position by a transfer of land.

Menwith Hill:

The security fence in the Main Gate area unlawfully encroached onto the highways’ verge outside the boundary. The fence had to be removed and reconstructed.

It is unacceptable that the UK authorities turn a blind eye towards unauthorised developments and it it incumbent on members of the public to have to complain.

The Bases are acknowledged to be targets for ‘terrorists’. The security of the Bases is totally ineffective and costs the USA and UK a considerable sum to maintain. Menwith Hill and Fylingdales bristle with razor-wire-topped high security fences, CCTV cameras, intruder alarm systems, and are constantly patrolled by armed police and guard dogs.

The UK Ministry of Defence Police Officers are ostensibly the defenders of the Bases. It is impossible for these Police Officers to secure the Bases, even were their numbers to be increased. Their main function is for propaganda purposes, to convey the impression that they are guarding UK facilities, which impression is reinforced in the Courts when they prosecute peace activists. The UK Government has admitted that at Menwith Hill they are actually paid for by USA, which not only reimburses the UK Government for personnel salaries and expenses, but also purchases and maintains their patrol vehicles and buildings.

The occupation of Menwith Hill by over 100 Greenpeace protesters in July 2001 revealed just how inadequate was the security. The response was to upgrade the security by installing more of the failed systems and increasing the police numbers.

The following public concerns have been reported in the local media:

The Bases are dependent on the support of the host nation. Their operations could not function without the logistics infrastructure, e.g. transport of supplies of water, food, electricity and disposal of sewage and garbage and a local workforce to service the Bases. All these impact on the environment external to the Bases. All are vulnerable to disruption (e.g. Some of the local workers are members of Trades Unions. The British Trades Union Congress of 2002 passed an anti-‘Star Wars’ resolution, condemning US Missile Defence).

Peace protesters have blockaded, and can be expected to continue to blockade, access roads to Menwith Hill, which obstruct movement of personnel and supplies into and out of the Base. Blockades have generated TV coverage allowing a platform for presentation of the arguments of the protesters.

In order to ensure that the essential services continue to be provided, it is politic for the Station authorities to maintain good relations with the host national government and the local community. Public relations’ propaganda ‘sells’ a benign and positive image and conceals any information, which might reflect adversely on the Bases and their personnel.

Currently the UK national and local authorities collaborate in the practice of a deception to keep the public ignorant, complacent and co-operative (e.g. describing Menwith Hill as a ‘Royal Air Force’ Station is a blatant propaganda hypocrisy, intended to persuade people to believe that it is British and thus playing an essential role in the defence of the realm). Thus the UK State is complicit with the illegal operations at Menwith Hill.

In a democracy the people elect their representatives and expect them to make decisions and appoint public servants to manage the State in the best interests of the electorate. If financial and other resources are expended on support for the US Bases, it follows that those resources are not available for investment in the environment (e.g. the North Yorkshire Highways’ Authority must provide and maintain roads to and from the Bases, which are not necessarily of benefit to the wider community).

The collusion is not confined only to the legislative and executive arms of the State, described herein, but is also supported by the judiciary.

The Judiciary’s support for the UK Government:

One example serves to illustrate that, not only is the UK Government aware of the illegalities perpetrated, it is prepared to condone them and its actions are supported by Her Majesty’s Judiciary.

Appeal: Helen John and Anne Lee: York Crown Court, 2 – 5 September 1997

The Court was obliged to examine the appellants’ defence accusation that the Secretary of State for Defence acted in ‘bad faith’ to protect and support illegal activities at Menwith Hill (the UK Ministry of Defence was the prosecutor not the defendant).

The judge rejected the argument on the grounds that the appellants were denied the right to question the Defence Secretary in the Courts about his actions. He is protected by ‘Parliamentary Privilege’. The appellants won the case not on the ‘bad faith’ argument, but on the fact that the Defence Secretary acted ultra vires - beyond the statutory powers of his office.

In his Judgment issued on 5 September 1997: the late Judge Jonathan Crabtree stated:

"It is said that wholesale breaches of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and of the European Convention on Human Rights must be going on [at Menwith Hill]…on the face of it, it rather looks as though Mrs Baird [Barrister] may be right in this contention…as a matter of law, the fact that some sort of illegality may be going on at a military base is not our concern. An illegality of some kind is doubtless going on...’

Under the cover of ‘national security’ the UK Government may impose a Public Interest Immunity Certificate to block disclosure of any prima facie evidence likely to be produced in Court, exposing the operations of the US Bases. Judge Crabtree attempted to prevent the presentation in Court of a statement by British Telecom – only to acknowledge that his efforts had been pre-empted by disclosure on the Internet.

The trial was a flagrant breach of Magna Carta: ‘To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice’. King John, Runnymede, 1215.

The Local Government Authorities: abuse of Judicial Process:

The collusion between the US Bases and the local Council authorities is illustrated by the following example:

North Yorkshire County Council v WoMenwith Hill Women’s Peace Camp women:Eviction Hearings: Divisional Court: November 1997 – July 1999:

February 5^th 1999:
It emerged during cross-examination of the North Yorkshire County Council 's Chief Highways Maintenance Engineer, who was under oath, that all documentary evidence relating to the local authorities' collusion with Menwith Hill had been deliberately withheld from the Court and the peacewomen respondents.

The judge, Hooper J, immediately adjourned the trial and ordered 'discovery', within one week, of all such correspondence. The Council 'discovered' 61 (sixty-one) relevant documents, which was still a limited disclosure. The correspondence revealed that the instigators of the eviction proceedings were the Menwith Hill Station authorities and that the Council Officers had discussed the possibility Menwith Hill making a financial contribution to the costs. (As there were five hearings in the High Court over a period of 20 months, the costs amounted to a substantial sum, believed to be in excess of £30,000).

The peacewomen submitted further affidavit arguments asserting that the national and local governments are fully aware of the illegal operations at Menwith Hill. The North Yorkshire County Council was thus guilty of bringing a case ‘with unclean hands’, by their covert unlawful collusion with the US National Security Agency in command of Menwith Hill.

This argument did not affect the Judgment.

Although the High Court had also to examine the peacewomen’s right to protest, as enshrined in the Human Rights’ Act 1998, the right to live outside Menwith Hill was not upheld and the Peace Camp was evicted on 19 August 1999.

In defiance of the High Court Injunction ordering peacewomen not to reside outside Menwith Hill, Helen John re-established the Women’s Peace Camp on 24 May 2004.

Considerable finances and resources are diverted from investment in the UK environment and expended to maintain the secrecy of the US Bases’ operations. It is not possible for members of the public to calculate the UK Government’s contribution to the support for the US Bases provided by the Security Services and the Government Communications Headquarters. It is assumed to amount to hundreds of millions of pounds.

Some indication of Britain’s commitment has been revealed by major exposures over the past 20 years, stripping away the layers of secrecy. They include:

The effectiveness of ‘single-issue’ pressure groups’ political activity, especially when it succeeds in changing attitudes, and thus policy decisions, at national and local government level should be a prime consideration for the Missile Defense Agency. For example, the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camps were instrumental in the decision to cancel the land-based, nuclear-armed Cruise Missile programme – as a consequence of which the US Base closed and environmental restoration work is underway.

The Yorkshire CND website http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org carries a comprehensive overview of the many different campaigning strategies deployed in opposition to the US Bases. All of them, including the non-violent civil disobedience actions, such as blockades, have an immediate impact on, and by influencing policy, the potential to change the environment.

The influence for change these opposition campaigns have achieved is difficult, if not impossible to assess, yet it is evident that changes in attitude have occurred and that they directly result from the presentation of an alternative viewpoint (e.g. the media now routinely describes Menwith Hill as ‘US Spy Base’).

One example will serve to illustrate:

In early 2001 approximately 200 people sent representations to the Harrogate Planning Department objecting to a development on the grounds that it was intended for US Missile Defence.

Because the Planning Application did not go before the elected Councillors, the first they knew of the plans and the objections was when it was reported in the Press that campaigners had approached a local Member of Parliament, who had then raised it with the Secretary of State for Defence.

In consequence Harrogate Council’s Chief Executive, on behalf of the Council, wrote to the Prime Minister to insist that the Council be kept fully informed of the implications of such developments. The Council demanded further information about the implications of Menwith Hill's US Missile Defense role for the local community. In October 2001, Councillors and Executive Officers from Harrogate Borough and North Yorkshire County Councils were invited to attend a meeting with top Civil Servants at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, London.

The Council representatives were given blatant propaganda assurances that Menwith Hill is considered to be of the highest importance for the UK’s national defence. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces repeated verbatim parliamentary and public statements his predecessors have issued. These assured the local authorities that Her Majesty’s Government is aware of all activities taking place at the Bases: that UK personnel are integrated at the highest level and that the Bases are not engaged in anything inimical to British interests.

Tony Benn, a former Cabinet Minister, as Secretary of State for Energy at the highest level of responsibility for the nuclear power programme, stated that government Ministers are the ‘elected ignorant’ – so little ‘sensitive’ information was divulged to him when in Office.

US Missile Defence: an unpopular programme

British public opinion has changed radically as a result of the publicity generated by the anti-'Star Wars' campaigns. An opinion poll conducted in the summer of 2001 revealed that nearly 70% of the British people opposed 'Star Wars'. At the same time 278 Members of Parliament signed an Early day Motion calling for a full debate in the House of Commons.

Recent polling indications suggest that the opposition is growing.

©* Anne Lee on behalf of WoMenwith Hill Women’s Peace Camp(aign)*

May be reproduced, with acknowledgement, for US Missile Defense Agency’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement purposes only. Any other reproduction only with author’s written permission.