The NMD system will use early warning satellites to detect the location of the launch site, the launch, and the direction of the incoming long range ballistic missiles. The current US early warning satellites, known as the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, are in what is known as geosynchronous orbit over the equator and use infrared sensors to detect missile plumes. The NMD system will use a replacement system for this purpose, called the Space-Based Infrared System-high earth orbit satellites, ("SBIRS-high"), which will be more capable of detecting the incoming long range ballistic missiles during their boost phase. This is the phase that occurs immediately after launch. Data from these satellites will be sent to the NMD 'battle-management center in the United States (at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado), which will attempt to identify the type of missile and where it is targeted. This information when taken together with other information provided by systems described below will be analysed and a decision will be taken whether to launch an interceptor to destroy the incoming missile. The interceptors will consist of a kill vehicle that will be boosted by a missile.

After the missile booster on the incoming missile stops burning and releases the warhead, the NMD system will detect the warhead and any other objects (such as missile debris and decoys), and will begin to track these objects and predict their future trajectories. The tracking will be done by several different sensors, including the ground-based early warning radars, ground-based X-band tracking radars, and space-based visible and infrared sensors on the Space-Based Infrared System-low earth orbit ("SBIRS-low") satellites. One of the five bases at which the ground based early warning radars and the X-band tracking radars will be located will be at RAF Fylingdales, North Yorkshire. These sensors will search an area of sky based on the approximate tracking data provided by the early warning satellites (SBIRS-high) until they detected the warhead. They will continue to track the warhead and will send this information to the NMD battle-management center to produce better predictions of its future trajectory.

At some point before an interceptor takes out the incoming long-range ballistic missile the NMD system must discriminate the incoming warhead from any debris and decoys. The radars and SBIRS-low satellites will attempt to do this, as will sensors on the kill vehicle, the interceptor; later in the trajectory. As soon as the NMD battle management center in the United States has decided which object to intercept, it will then launch one or more interceptors directed to the predicted intercept point with the warhead.

Descnption of the SBIRS-high Satellite System

The SBIRS-high system is expected to consist of 5 satellites in two types of orbit. Four satellites will be in geosynchronous orbit over the equator, so that they can continuously view large regions of the earth. In addition, there will be two satellites in highly elliptical orbits that will increase the coverage of the system in the polar regions.

These satellites will use sensitive infrared detectors that can detect the bright plume of an incoming ballistic long range missile in its boost phase, during the first few minutes of flight. They will provide considerably better information than the current-generation DSP satellites, which have a scanning array of sensors that views a particular location only every 10 seconds. Instead, SBIRS-high will include staring sensors that can watch a missile continuously, and will therefore be able to provide considerably better position, orientation, and speed information.

The operation of the US NMD system will begin with warning of a long range ballistic missile launch supplied by the SBIRS-high early warning radars. This warning together with other information will be transmitted through several ground stations to the NMD battle management center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Two ground stations are planned outside of the United States: a European Relay Ground Station at Menwith Hill and an Overseas Ground Station in Australia.

The information from SBIRS-high is crucial to the operation of the missile defense system for several reasons. First, this data will be the first indication of a missile launch and will therefore set in motion a number of activities required to attempt an intercept.

Second, as stated above, this data will be used to determine the location of the incoming missile and the approximate direction of the trajectory. In addition, it will give estimates of the burntime and burnout, speed of the missile. This data will first be used to attempt to determine the type of missile, its range, and its approximate impact point. This information will then be used to determine whether the missile appeared to pose a threat and whether the NMD system should attempt to intercept it.

If a decision is made to activate the NMD system and attempt to intercept the missile, the approximate trajectory data from SBIRS-high will be crucial for cueing the other tracking sensors including the ground-based early warning and X-band tracking radars and the SBIRS-low satellite sensor. The trajectory data will be used to give these additional sensors an estimate of what region of space they should search to detect the incoming warhead. Since SBIRS-high will provide a good estimate of the missile's trajectory, it will reduce the region of space these other sensors must search and will therefore allow them lo detect the warhead at a greater distance than would otherwise be possible. This increased detection range is important since it means that the NMD system will have a longer time to operate and will be able to attempt to intercept at longer ranges or at an earlier stage in the flight of the missile.

Thus, SBIRS-high starts the clock for the NMD system, it supplies the key information for deciding whether to attempt to intercept the missile and it provides high-quality information that is crucial for maximizing the time available for the NMD system to operate.

A Description of the Upgraded Early Warning System to be installed at RAF Fylingdales.

The United States currently deploys early warning radars at several locations worldwide. These radars are designed to track incoming missiles and war heads in flight after the early warning satellites can no longer do so. The current early warning radars consist of three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars known as BMEWS in Alaska, Greenland and Britain (at RAF Fylingdales) and two Pave Paws radars in California and Massachusetts. These radars are currently not able to track incoming missiles with a high enough degree of accuracy to guide interceptors to their targets.

It is intended that the early warning radars will be upgraded to improve the radars’ tracking capability. Using data from the early warning satellites the upgraded early warning radars will search the appropriate area of sky to detect the incoming ballistic missiles. Once detected, the location of the incoming long range ballistic missile will be transmitted to NMD-battle center in the United States. The steps I have described above will then come into operation.

However, even with the upgraded early warning radar system, the radars will only have limited capabilities to discriminate warheads from decoys or other false targets. Therefore, the NMD system will also deploy a number of new X-band radars that are specifically designed for NMD system use. They will have an improved range resolution, and discrimination and tracking capabilities than the upgraded early warning radars. It is intended that an X-band radar system will be built at RAF Fylingdales

The Reaction of Russian, China and Other Countries to the NMD System

The purpose of the NMD System as stated in the National Missile Defense Act signed by President Clinton on 23^rd July 1999 is to defend "the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorised or deliberate)” The intention behind NMD is to reduce the risk to citizens of the United States of large scale death and destruction from a long range missile attack. However, this intention appears to have been misplaced due to the reaction of other States to the deployment of the planned NMD system.

The two counties who have reacted with the most criticism of the NMD system have been Russia and China. Both countries have alleged that the deployment of the NMD system will breach the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty of 1972 ("the ABM Treaty”). This is a bilateral Treaty between the United States and Russia. This allegation has been largely accepted by the United States Government who have responded with the suggestion that the ABM Treaty will need to be amended to accommodate the NMD system. Russia has refused to amend the ABM Treaty.

Russia has been outspoken in its criticism of the planned NMD System, the fact that it will breach the ABM Treaty add the resulting detrimental effect on world peace. Various statements have been made by senior Russian politicians during the course of 1999 and 2000 slating that the deployment of the NMD system and the breach of the ABM Treaty will have two consequential effects. First, that it will "inevitably upset the whole system of international treaties in the disarmament field" and second that "it can trigger a new round of a strategic arms race including in outer space, and undermine the existing non-proliferation regime”. (Vasily Sidorov, Russian Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament reported in Reuters on 5^th November 1999). Earlier Colonel General Vladimir Yakoviev, commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces stated "Problems have cropped up now with the Russian-American 1972 ABM Treaty; for this reason, we are forced to build (in) to our new missiles a capability for penetrating anti-missile defenses", (reported in Izvestia on 6^th May 1999).

It is within the range of options open to Russia to maintain a larger number of ballistic missile warheads that it would otherwise have done. It could extend the life of its existing large, multiple-warheads ICBMs or fit its newer land-based missiles with multiple warheads. Another alternative would be for Russia to consider alternative ways of delivering nuclear weapons. It could rehabilitate its strategic bomber force, or it could redeploy long range land attack cruise missiles on ships or submarines.

I now refer to China and its concerns about the United States deploying the NMD system. Given the smaller size and vulnerability of China's strategic nuclear forces, any concerns that have been aroused in Russia by the deployment of the NMD system would hold far more strongly to China. It is reasonable to expect that China would respond so as to maintain the deterrent capability of China's nuclear forces.

The Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated at a conference on disarmament in Geneva on the 26^th March 1999 that "Progress in nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without a global strategic equilibrium and stability. The research, development, deployment and proliferation of sophisticated anti-missile systems and the revision of, or even withdrawal from, the existing disarmament treaties on which global strategic equilibrium hinges will inevitably exert an extensive negative impact on international security and stability and trigger off a new round of arms race in new areas, thereby seriously neutralizing international efforts of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

In its response to the deployment of the NMD system China has two basic options; to deploy countermeasures or to increase the size of its nuclear force by deploying more missiles and/or deploying multiple warheads on missiles. I believe that the build-up and modernisation of China's ICBM force is a likely consequence. To maintain the ability to increase the size of its arsenal. China is likely to refuse to agree to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. China is also likely to fail to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and it may even resume nuclear testing in order to develop countermeasures to the NMD system or warheads for multiple warhead missiles.

The most recent declaration by both Russian and China was a joint response to the planned deployment of the NMD system. It followed a summit meeting in Beijing in July of this year and the release of a joint statement signed by Vladimir Putin, President of Russia and Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the Peoples Republic of China. I refer to the joint statement marked "DW1”. The Joint statement confirms the strong opposition by both countries and the likelihood of a new arms race following the deployment of the NMD system. Having stated that the ABM Treaty ~remains the cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security" the joint statement proclaims:

“We are deeply worried in this connection by the US plan of creating a national missile defence system prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Russia and China believe that this plan boils down to the striving for unilateral superiority in the military sphere and security issues. The implementation of such plan would have most serious negative consequences for the security of not only Russia China and other countries, but also for the security of the USA itself and for global strategic stability in the world as a whole. This is why Russia and China are resolutely protesting against the plan.

The destruction of the ABM Treaty would trigger off a new stage of the arms race and turn back positive trends in global politics that appeared after the end of the Cold War. This certainly does not meet the vital interests of any state of the world. States that advocate a review of this fundamental treaty in the sphere of arms reductions will bear full responsibility for undermining international stability and security and for the consequences of this action".

There have also been strong pronouncements by NATO officials and the French President against the NMD system. Their fears are similar to those expressed by Russia and China. The French President Jacques Chirac stated that:

"We must avoid any questioning of the ABM Treaty that could lead to disruption of strategic equilibria and a new nuclear arms race."

"China, which was already working harder than we realized on both nuclear weapons and deliver vehicles for them, would of course be encouraged to intensify those efforts, and it has the resources to do so. India would be encouraged to do the same thing, and it, too has the resources. And it would also increase tensions within NATO, which would be too bad". New York Times 12^th March 1999.

A NATO official stated "If you start this (NMD), you're starting the arms race back up" US News & World Report 13^th December 1999. A European defence official stated "We are worried the Americans are going to ruin the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and then the whole deck of cards would tumble down". Defense News 13^th December 1999.

It is therefore clear from the available evidence that the response of Russia and China to the deployment of the NMD system will be the deployment by both countries of a greater number of warheads than otherwise planned. That this view is held within NATO and some of the Western Allies. It will also have a detrimental effect on cooperative efforts by the United States, Russia and China to decrease the number of nuclear weapons.